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The U.S. income tax is broken. Due to the realization doctrine and 
taxpayers’ consequent ability to defer taxation of gains, taxpayers can easily 
minimize or avoid the taxation of investment income, a failure that is 
magnified many times over when considering the ultra-wealthy. As a result, 
this small group of taxpayers commands an enormous share of national 
wealth yet pays paltry taxes relative to the economic income their wealth 
produces—a predicament that this Article condemns as being economically, 
politically, and socially harmful.  
The realization doctrine is widely justified as an accommodation made 
for administrative convenience. Although there have been numerous 
proposals for current-assessment reforms that would abandon or limit the 
realization doctrine—including wealth tax reform proposals, accrual income 
tax reform proposals, and others—most tax policy scholars and 
commentators have disfavored these reform proposals in favor of reforms that 
would retain the realization doctrine in full. There are two primary reasons 
for this. First, current-assessment reforms face administrative challenges 
such as those related to asset valuation and liquidity. However, these 
challenges are surmountable, especially when it comes to reforms targeted at 
the ultra-wealthy. Indeed, recent scholarly work shows how a wealth tax 
reform can be designed so as to be superior at valuation as compared to the 
existing U.S. income tax. 
This leaves us with the second primary reason for why wealth tax and 
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other current-assessment reform proposals have been disfavored: prior 
scholarship has generally assumed that the problems created by the 
realization doctrine can be fixed on the back end by adjusting the rules that 
govern taxation at the time of realization. Specifically, most tax policy 
scholars have favored reform proposals—such as retrospective capital gains 
taxation, progressive consumption taxation, or more incremental reforms—
that would retain the realization doctrine, but that would aim to impose taxes 
in a way that would erase or reduce the financial benefits of deferral. 
However, this Article argues that these future-assessment approaches 
ignore a crucial additional problem of deferral—political optionality. If there 
is a many-year or longer gap between when either income is earned or wealth 
is accrued and when tax is assessed, then any number of things can happen 
in the interim to undermine the eventual assessment and collection of tax. 
This Article explains three sets of pressures that tend to erode future-
assessment reforms over time—but that current-assessment reforms are 
relatively resistant to—(1) policy drift and the need for incremental bolstering 
of tax reforms, (2) the time value of options, and (3) federal budget rules and 
related political incentives.  
As this Article demonstrates, both theory and historical experience reveal 
that future-assessment reforms are fragile and often fail—and that ultra-
wealthy taxpayers are well aware of this. In other words, accounting for the 
implications of political optionality, only current-assessment reforms are 
likely to succeed at meaningfully taxing the ultra-wealthy and fixing the 
personal tax system. Hence, we must tax now, or risk taxing never.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Larry Ellison, the founder and still largest shareholder of the software 
company, Oracle, has a net worth in the neighborhood of $72 billion, making 
him the fifth richest person in the world.1 He has used this wealth to, among 
other things, build a $270 million yacht2 and a $200 million home (one of 
many),3 and buy the Hawaiian island of Lanai for $300 million.4 Of course, 
it is not surprising that a person with wealth like that spends it accordingly—
except that Ellison famously has sold very little of his Oracle stock.5 And for 
a long time, he had base salary of only $1 per year as CEO of Oracle.6 He 
instead fuels this consumption out of a $10 billion personal credit line.7  
Why would one of the richest men in the world take on such debt? Selling 
just a fraction of his stock would pay for all of his purchases and more. The 
simple answer is: taxes.8 At today’s capital gains rates, selling the stock 
necessary to cover that potential $10 billion of spending would mean cutting 
a check to the government for over $2 billion. Instead, Ellison is taking 
advantage of one of the most powerful tax avoidance strategies that exists—
simply not realizing gain. Ellison, or his estate, will eventually have to pay 
any borrowed money back. Nevertheless, by deferring any realization of gain 
until some theoretical future date, Ellison has at least lowered—or likely 
 
1 Larry Ellison, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/larry-ellison.  
2 Barry Pickthall, Allen vs. Ellison, YACHTING, Oct. 3, 2007, 
https://www.yachtingmagazine.com/allen-vs-ellison.  
3 Morgan Brennan, The World’s Most Expensive Billionaire Homes in the World, 
FORBES, March 29, 2013, https://www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2013/03/29/the-
most-expensive-billionaire-homes-in-the-world/#2cac5e881d14.  
4 Duane Shimogawa, PBN confirms amount billionaire Larry Ellison paid for Hawaiian 
island of Lanai, PACIFIC BUSINESS NEWS, Jan. 7, 2016, 
https://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/blog/2016/01/pbn-confirms-amount-billionaire-larry-
ellison-paid.html.  
5 See, e.g., Julie Bort, Larry Ellison Has Secured $10 Billion Worth of Credit For His 
Personal Spending, BUSINESS INSIDER, Sept. 26, 2014, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/larry-ellison-has-a-10b-credit-line-2014-9;  Robert Frank, 
How Larry Ellison Actually Funds His Lavish Lifestyle, CNBC, Sept. 27, 2012, 
https://www.cnbc.com/id/49194482.  
6  See, e.g., Rachel Gillett and Marissa Perino, 13 top executives who earn a $1 salary 
or less, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 22, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/ceos-who-take-
1-dollar-salary-or-less-2015-8. To be clear, Ellison still takes home in plenty in stock 
options, in-kind payments, bonuses, and other compensation. 
7 Caleb Melby, Billionaire Ellison Boosts Credit Line to $10.8 Billion, BLOOMBERG, 
Sept. 25, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-25/billionaire-ellison-
boosts-oracle-credit-line-to-10-8-billion; Bort, supra. note 5. 
8 There may be non-tax reasons at play as well, including an interest in maintaining 
control over Oracle, though as other technology entrepreneurs have shown that can be 
managed in other ways.  
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wiped out entirely—any tax due.9  
The U.S. tax system does a very poor job of taxing the ultra-wealthy.10  
Most Americans predominantly earn wage and salary income, which the U.S. 
income tax measures reasonably well.11 By contrast, the ultra-wealthy 
predominantly earn income that arises from the returns to owning wealth (or 
that can be made to appear as though it arises from the returns to owning 
wealth), which the U.S. income tax measures dreadfully.12 Because the U.S. 
income tax is so bad at reaching the returns to owning wealth,13 an ultra-
wealthy person could, to a first approximation, earn over $10 billion and 
spend it on islands and yachts without ever paying income tax. 
This deep failure of the U.S. income tax has implications beyond just the 
windfall for the ultra-wealthy. As we will explain,14 this state of affairs 
violates even the minimal fairness requirement that the personal income tax 
not be regressive. This state of affairs also harms economic efficiency, 
because the tax gaming techniques that the ultra-wealthy use to lower their 
tax burdens are wasteful and economically damaging. Further, this state of 
affairs undermines both the administrability and integrity of the entire U.S. 
tax system, through the tax system’s struggles to cope with the destructive 
effects of the ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming. In a sense, the problems caused by 
the ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming thus “trickle down,” creating harmful 
complexity, along with traps for the unwary, and resulting inefficiencies and 
 
9 See, e.g., Chuck Marr, Samantha Jacoby, and Kathleen Bryant, Substantial Income of 
Wealthy Households Escapes Annual Taxation or Enjoys Special Tax Breaks, Ctr. on Budget 
and Pol. Priorities, at 8, Nov. 13, 2019, 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-13-19tax.pdf.  
10 See, e.g., Ari Glogower, Taxing Inequality, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1421, 1424 (2018) 
(“With these changes, Congress has taken a hammer to a progressive income tax system that 
was already broken.); Mark P. Gergen, How to Tax Capital, 70 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2016) (“It 
is well known that the existing system in the United States for taxing capital income is a 
mess.”); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 920 
(2005) (“Taxes on capital are easily avoided and virtually voluntary.”). 
As we will elaborate in Part I.A, infra, we use the phrase “ultra-wealthy” to refer to 
households in the top 0.1% (more or less) of wealth in the United States, a group that is 
estimated to consist of approximately 175,000 households who collectively own between 
15% and 20% of national wealth. 
11 Lily Batchelder and David Kamin, Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options, Sept. 11, 
2019, at 4, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452274 
12 Id. at 4-8. 
13 For a summary of the economics research demonstrating this, see C. Eugene Steuerle, 
Individuals Pay Very Little Individual Income Tax on Capital Income, TAXVOX, Sept. 6, 
2018, available at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/individuals-pay-very-little-
individual-income-tax-capital-income. See also Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth 
Seriously, 70 TAX L. REV. 305 (2017).  
14 See infra Part II.  
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unfairness affecting many ordinary taxpayers.15    
But why is the U.S. tax system so bad at measuring the economic income 
of the ultra-wealthy? The chief reason is that the U.S. income tax is 
realization-based and consequently allows tax on investment income to be 
deferred.16 Taxpayers have devised techniques—some very simple, some 
quite complex—for delaying realization of their investment income, so that 
the tax is not owed in the years in which that income is earned or generated, 
but is instead assessed only at some future date—or often never. As the 
economist C. Eugene Steuerle has explained, “[m]ost capital income earned 
never is taxed at the individual level, in part because assets are often not sold 
and their gains never subject to income tax, in part because capital income 
benefits from a long list of tax preferences, and in part because of outright 
evasion.”17 
Many prominent tax reform proposals would seek to eliminate 
opportunities for reducing or negating these deferred tax liabilities but would 
retain the realization doctrine—we call these future-assessment tax reform 
proposals. The motivating thought behind these proposals is that deferral 
need not be a problem, in and of itself, so long as deferred tax liabilities are 
eventually taxed at high enough rates to eliminate the tax advantages from 
deferral. For instance, most of the major income tax reform proposals would 
operate in this fashion, as would most of the major consumption tax reform 
proposals, as well as most other proposals for what are sometimes called 
“retrospective” style tax reforms.18 The theory is that if any future tax would 
 
15 The use of “trickle down” here is a reference (and an admittedly snide reference) to 
trickle-down economics; see Shu-Chun Susan Yang, Do Capital Income Tax Cuts Trickle 
Down?, 60 NAT. TAX J. 551 (2007). 
16 We use the term “investment income” to refer to income that can be characterized as 
being derived from the returns to owning wealth (as opposed to pure wage and salary income 
and the like), so that tax on this income can be deferred under the rules of the existing U.S. 
income tax. We use this term instead of the more commonly used term “capital income”, 
because the term “capital income” is used in disparate and often inconsistent ways by 
different tax scholars and tax authorities. In particular, much of the income that qualifies for 
deferral under the existing income tax falls outside of what economists would typically 
consider to be “capital income.”  See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 
UCLA L. REV. 60, 61 (2011) (“When structured correctly, founders’ stock allows 
entrepreneurs to defer paying tax until they sell the stock…”); Victor Fleischer, Two And 
Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits In Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) 
(“By getting paid in part with carry instead of cash, fund managers defer the tax on income 
derived from their human capital.”).  
17 Steuerle, supra note 13. 
18 See infra Part III.B for discussion of retrospective capital gains tax and progressive 
consumption tax reform proposals. For other examples of “retrospective” style tax reforms, 
see, e.g. Greg Leiserson, Taxing Wealth, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE: EFFICIENT AND 
EQUITABLE WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE 89, at 107–114 (Moss, Nunn, & Shambaugh, eds., 
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be the present-value equivalent of a current tax (which today it is not), then 
the timing of the tax ought to be irrelevant. 
As we argue here, however, the assumption that a future assessed tax 
could be as effective as a currently assessed tax is deeply flawed. Instead, to 
meaningfully tax the ultra-wealthy—and thereby start to repair our broken 
income tax—current-assessment tax reform is required. 
By current assessment we mean any set of rules that actually collects tax 
in the same time periods in which income is earned or accrued, or 
alternatively, in the same time periods as when wealth or spending power is 
accumulated. Examples include wealth taxes,19 mark-to-market or other 
accrual income taxes,20 and even consumption taxes implemented along with 
pre-payment or withholding mechanisms.21  
Central to any current-assessment system is the need to value assets at a 
point prior to sale or other realization, so that any unrealized gain can be 
measured and taxed.22 It is partially because of this need for asset valuation 
that most tax policy scholars and tax reform advocates have disfavored 
 
2020) (proposing both realization-based accrual tax and realization-based wealth tax 
reforms); James Kwak, Reducing Inequality with a Retrospective Tax on Capital, 25 
CORNELL J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 191 (2015) (proposing a “retrospective capital tax”).  
Perhaps even more important than these future-assessment approaches for fundamental 
tax reform, many scholars and commentators have argued that it would be better to just 
incrementally patch the existing income tax by improving compliance and removing major 
loopholes—especially by removing Section 1014’s step-up in basis (but see infra Part 
III.C.3. for our discussion of why this approach would likely fail). These more incremental 
approaches to reform would preserve the realization-based nature of the income tax, and we 
thus consider these to be future-assessment approaches for reform. That is, even though these 
reforms might limit deferral somewhat as compared to the status quo and thereby make the 
income tax slightly less future-assessment oriented, these approaches would still mostly 
maintain both deferral and the broader future-assessment nature of the income tax, making 
it appropriate in our view to label these as future-assessment reforms. For examples of such 
incremental reform proposals, see, e.g., Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, Tax Reform 
for Progressivity: A Pragmatic Approach, in TACKLING THE TAX CODE: EFFICIENT AND 
EQUITABLE WAYS TO RAISE REVENUE, supra, at 317; David Kamin, How to Tax the Rich, 
146 TAX NOTES 119, 124-29 (2015).  
19 A wealth tax of course does not tax income per se. But most proposals for annual 
wealth taxes would tax an amount less than the average returns to wealth, and thus can be 
seen as a way for the government to share in those returns as they accrue. This can be 
distinguished from one-time confiscatory taxes, such as a (well-functioning) estate tax.  
20 Greg Leiserson and Will McGrew, Taxing Wealth By Taxing Investment Income: An 
Introduction To Mark-To-Market Taxation, WASHINGTON CENTER FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 
ISSUE BRIEF, at 4–5 (September 11, 2019) (explaining mark-to-market and accrual 
approaches for reform).  
21 For explanation, see infra Part III.B.2. 
22 E.g., David Gamage, Five Key Research Findings on Wealth Taxation for the Super 
Rich (July 27, 2019), at 14-16, available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427827; Ari 
Glogower, Taxing Capital Appreciation, 70 TAX L. REV. 111, 133–42 (2016). 
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current-assessment reforms.23 While the realization doctrine has historical 
roots in outdated notions of what can be considered “income” conceptually 
and for purposes of the 16th Amendment,24 the standard view today is that 
realization is a necessary evil because it is difficult to do annual valuations of 
relatively illiquid assets, such as shares in private corporations, partnership 
interests, real estate, and artwork.25 
These valuation and related problems present real and difficult 
challenges, to be sure. However, these challenges are surmountable, 
especially with regard to current-assessment reforms targeted at only the 
ultra-wealthy. Indeed, recent scholarly and law-reform work shows how 
current-assessment reforms can be designed so as to be superior at valuation 
as compared to the existing U.S. income tax.26 In any case, there are a number 
 
23 See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties Of Taxing 
Wealth, 58 NOMOS 261, 262 (2017) (“Not only is an annual wealth tax susceptible to 
constitutional challenges, for example, but such a tax would be hobbled by valuation 
issues.”); Kamin, supra note 18, at 123 (“The problem—one of several long-standing 
objections to mark-to-market accounting and annual wealth taxes—is valuation.”); James R. 
Repetti, Commentary: It’s All About Valuation, 53 TAX L. REV. 607, 608 (“[V]aluation, 
which is the major difficulty in achieving an ideal income tax that periodically measures 
accretions to wealth is also the major difficulty in achieving an ideal wealth tax.”). 
24 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); John R. Brooks, The Definitions of 
Income, 71 TAX L. REV. 253, 268 (2018); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Are Stock Dividends 
Income?, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 517, 518 (1919). 
25 David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (1998) 
(“[Realizaiton] is typically justified as a necessary evil, in that alternatives—such as taxing 
unrealized gains … are not administrable or politically feasible.”). 
26 David Gamage et. al., Valuation and Measurement for a Wealth Tax Reform, 
Roosevelt Institute Report (unpublished draft report on file with authors, expected 
publication in March 2021); David Gamage & John R. Brooks, Building Better Wealth Tax 
and Accrual Income Tax Reforms (incomplete draft manuscript on file with authors); David 
Gamage, supra note 22, at 14–16.  
Also, one of us (Gamage), has recently co-drafted both a proposed wealth tax current-
assessment reform bill for the State of California and a mark-to-market current-assessment 
reform bill for the State of New York, both of which incorporate some innovations (that we 
will explain more fully in future scholarship) for mitigating concerns related to valuation and 
liquidity; see AB-2088 WEALTH TAX, AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 13, 2020, 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE—2019-2020 REGULAR SESSION, available at 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB2088 
(Sections 50307-50309 contain our valuation innovations, and Subsection 50307(c) contains 
our liquidity innovations); David Gamage, Emmanuel Saez, and Darien Shanske, The 
California Extreme Wealth Tax: Revenue, Economic, and Constitutional Analysis (August 
10, 2020), available at https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/CAwealthtax.pdf; SENATE BILL 
S8277B, 2019-2020 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE, 
available at https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s8277; Letter to Governor 
Cuomo, Speaker Stewart-Cousins, and Speaker Heastie, by Darien Shanske, David Gamage, 
& Emmanuel Saez, available at https://www.politico.com/states/f/?id=00000176-4ed9-
d3e7-a3ff-dfd923d80000.  
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of prior proposals that we think would do a sufficiently decent job of 
mitigating these challenges while enacting reasonably effective current-
assessment reforms.27 The point being that solutions to these problems exist, 
even if these solutions are not perfect. These proposals have different 
strengths and weaknesses, and fully evaluating the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various existing proposals for current-assessment 
reforms is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article argues that 
we should adopt one of these proposals, or else develop better ones, because 
a current-assessment reform is necessary to fix our broken income tax. We 
must tax now, or else risk taxing never. 
Current-assessment tax reform is needed because the U.S. political 
system is not up to the task of maintaining comprehensive and sufficient 
taxation of deferred tax liabilities long enough to actually collect that tax 
sufficiently in the future. Allowing an extended time between passing a 
reform and actually collecting tax opens up too many opportunities for 
administrative maneuvering, for the development of new avoidance 
techniques, for a change in fundamental economic conditions, or for simply 
waiting for a change in political power. 
Put another way, it is entirely plausible that a new governing coalition 
might be elected at some point in the coming years with sufficient votes to 
enact a major tax reform with the goal of fixing how the existing tax system 
is broken with respect to the ultra-wealthy. But if that is a future-assessment 
reform, it is implausible to expect that this coalition would remain in power 
long enough, while maintaining sufficient commitment to bolstering its tax 
reform throughout, to prevent new opportunities from emerging in the future 
for taxpayers to negate or reduce their deferred tax liabilities. We argue that 
the most likely outcome is an incremental weakening of the reform in the face 
of these forces, perhaps culminating in outright repeal after a shift in political 
power.28 And this process is made easier because a future-assessment reform 
that has yet to collect much revenue is distinctly disadvantaged politically 
and budgetarily.29 
To clarify this argument, we distinguish here between two benefits of 
deferral. Almost universally when the prior literature has referred to the tax 
benefit of deferral, that literature has considered only the benefits baked into 
existing law. These include, for example, taking advantage of the time value 
of money by delaying realization or waiting for the Section 1014 step-up in 
 
27 E.g., Elizabeth Warren, Ultra-Millionaire Tax, available at 
https://elizabethwarren.com/ultra-millionaire-tax/; Edward D. Kleinbard, The Right Tax at 
the Right Time, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 208 (2017); Mark P. Gergen, supra note 10, at 1. See also 
the proposals cited in note 26, id. 
28 See infra Subsection III.A.1. 
29 See infra Subsections III.A.3–4. 
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basis. But the literature has mostly ignored a second benefit of deferral, which 
we refer to as the political optionality benefit of deferral.30 In short, deferring 
the point at which the law imposes tax gives taxpayers time and opportunity 
to wait for the law to weaken or change—or even to lobby for such a change. 
History shows time and again that ultra-wealthy taxpayers are well aware 
of the limits of the U.S. political system and can thus be expected to defer 
their tax liabilities while waiting for future opportunities to permanently 
negate or reduce their deferred tax liabilities.31 Thus, it is not enough to 
continue to rely on realization to trigger taxation in the future while hoping 
to impose a present-value equivalent tax at that time. Unless some as-of-yet 
unknown mechanism can be created to prevent new opportunities for 
reducing or negating deferred tax liabilities from arising in the future, no tax 
reform that permits deferral will succeed at fixing how the personal tax 
system is broken. 
This Article elaborates three sets of pressures that tend to undermine 
future-assessment reforms over time, but that current-assessment reforms are 
relatively resistant to. The first set of pressures arises from policy drift and 
the need for incremental bolstering of major tax reforms. For a number of 
reasons, the nature of tax politics creates asymmetric pressures that tend to 
push toward undermining tax reforms—especially reforms targeted at the 
ultra-wealthy. Consequently, it is crucial that as many key mechanics of a 
major tax reform as possible be implemented at or immediately following the 
time of the reform’s enactment, while the initial reform coalition still retains 
its strength and commitment to the reform. Because future-assessment 
reforms put off the actual assessment and collection of tax, such reforms also 
put off the time when key administrative decisions and technical corrections 
are made, making it dramatically more likely that the reform will be 
substantially undermined over time. 
The second set of pressures arises from the time value of options. Future-
assessment reforms give taxpayers the choice of when to realize their tax 
liabilities—when to exercise the option value of deciding in which future 
political regime a deferred tax liability will be realized, assessed, and paid. 
This creates strong incentives for ultra-wealthy taxpayers both to wait for 
(favorable to them) future legal or political changes and to lobby and exert 
other political pressures in the hopes of creating such future changes. 
The third set of pressures arises from federal budget rules and resulting 
 
30 Important exceptions to this, especially in the context of current tax reform 
discussions, include David Kamin and Jason Oh, The Effects of Capital Gains Rate 
Uncertainty on Realization, UCLA Law & Economics Research Paper No. 19-06 (2019), 
and Daniel Hemel, Taxing Wealth in an Uncertain World, 72 NAT’L TAX J. 755 (2019). We 
have been aided in this project from these papers and our conversations with the authors.  
31 See infra Section III.C. 
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political incentives. For federal budget scoring purposes, much of the tax 
revenue that might theoretically be raised by a future-assessment tax reform 
will show up outside of the budget window. This makes it much more 
politically difficult to legislate bolstering and strengthening such reforms 
while making it much easier politically to legislate weakening such reforms. 
This Article proceeds first (in Part I) by further clarifying how the existing 
U.S. income tax is broken, then (in Part II) by arguing that this brokenness 
creates serious unfairnesses and inefficiencies that weaken the entire existing 
tax system and that motivate our call for reform, and finally (in Part III) by 
explaining the three sets of pressures that tend to undermine future-
assessment reforms—but that current-assessment reforms are relatively 
resistant to—developing these explanations based on theory as well as by 
examining both specific future-assessment reforms and the history of prior 
reform attempts. 
 
I. THE INCOME TAX IS BROKEN 
 
A central motivation of this Article is that taxation of the ultra-wealthy is 
both necessary and currently inadequate, and furthermore that this failure to 
tax the ultra-wealthy is a systemic problem that undermines the overall 
income tax. The problem is not merely that some rich people get marginally 
richer. Rather, the manner in which the tax system benefits the ultra-wealthy 
reveals core problems and threatens the integrity of the tax system itself.32 
In this Part we begin with a description of the ultra-wealthy and the nature 
of their income and wealth. The key point is that “[t]hey are different from 
you and me”33 in the ways that they earn income and acquire wealth, and 
therefore how they interact with the tax system. Based on those differences, 
we then turn to how the income tax is broken. The income tax system does a 
reasonably good job of taxing wages and other regularly earned income from 
labor, but does a very poor job of reaching the returns to wealth and other 
stores of financial capital.34 (Readers already familiar with how investment 
 
32 Of course, the failure to tax the ultra-wealthy is not the only way in which the existing 
U.S. tax system is broken. For instance, we consider important aspects of the business-level 
tax system to also be broken. However, we will argue that the manner in which the existing 
U.S. personal income tax is broken with respect to the wealthiest individuals and families 
makes it harder to mend other ways in which the existing tax system is broken, so that fixing 
how the personal tax system is broken with respect to the ultra-wealthy is a good starting 
point for reform. 
33 F. Scott Fitzgerald, “The Rich Boy,” in ALL THE SAD YOUNG MEN (1926). 
34 Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 11, at 4 (“Wages comprise the vast majority of 
income for those outside of the top 1 percent of income… Tax avoidance and evasion are 
rare for wage income because it is subject to information reporting and withholding, and 
because wage earners generally cannot manipulate the timing of income recognition…”). 
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income is currently only scantily taxed may wish to skip or skim this Part.) 
 
A. Who Are the Ultra-Wealthy? 
 
The focus of this article is on the taxation of a particular subgroup of 
American taxpayers that we label as the “ultra-wealthy.”35 By this we mean 
tax households in the top 0.1% (more or less) of wealth in the United States.36 
This is, to be clear, a relatively small group—approximately 235,000 
individuals37 or 175,000 tax households.38  
So, who are they and what does their financial picture look like? We 
should say at the outset that comprehensive and reliable data on wealth 
distribution is thinner than for income. Much of the information we have is 
from government surveys, which have some weakness in tracking some 
forms of privately-held wealth and attributing them to individuals.39 That 
 
35 We describe this Article’s project and narrow its focus in this way because we are 
abstracting here from larger questions about the proper tax base(s) for a tax regime as a 
whole; our question here is on the particular tools and policies needed to meaningfully tax 
this small group of taxpayers, regardless of how the remaining tax system is constituted. 
Indeed, as we will argue, due to the way the wealth and income of this group is derived, any 
modern tax system must consider the issues we raise if it wishes to successfully tax this 
group. That is, regardless of whether a country as a whole chooses to tax income, wealth, 
consumption, or some other measure for economic well-being, or some mixture of these, we 
believe that successful taxation of the ultra-wealthy requires use of a current-assessment 
mechanism (as we will argue in Part III). 
36 Over time, the top taxpayers by wealth will roughly correspond to the top taxpayers 
by income, but income-based measurements tend to fluctuate more over time as compared 
to wealth-based measurements, so that the top taxpayers by income in any particular year 
will correspond less with the top taxpayers by wealth as compared to considering the top 
taxpayers by income across a longer time frame.  
37 Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar, & Eric Zwick, Top Wealth in the United States: New 
Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich, at 49, tbl.1 (July 19, 2019) (unpublished 
working paper, preliminary draft) (on file with authors). 
38 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, tbl.2 (Oct. 18, 
2019) (unpublished working paper, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, final draft) (on 
file with authors). 
39 On issues of measurement and missing wealth, see generally, e.g., GABRIEL ZUCMAN, 
THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS (Teresa Lavender Fagen 
trans.) (2015); Wojciech Kopczuk, Comment on “Progressive Wealth Taxation” by Saez and 
Zucman, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (forthcoming 2019); Emmanuel Saez & 
Gabriel Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
(forthcoming 2019); Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, 11 AM. REV. ECON. 109 
(2019); Matthew Smith, Owen Zidar & Eric Zwick, Top Wealth in the United States: New 
Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich (July 19, 2019 draft); Annette Alstadsæter, 
Niels Johannsen & Gabriel Zucman, Who Owns the Wealth in Tax Havens? Macro Evidence 
and Implications for Global Inequality, 162 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (2018); Emmanuel Saez & 
Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence From 
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said, we can still know to a reasonably high degree of certainty that certain 
types of wealth are held by the class as a whole, even if we can’t assign it to 
particular individuals. 
Let’s begin with the top 0.1% of households in terms of wealth (rather 
than in terms of income or consumption). In a recent paper, Emmanuel Saez 
and Gabriel Zucman, two of the leading economists studying income and 
wealth inequality, use a range of methodologies to estimate that these 
175,000 households own between 15% and 20% of national wealth, with a 
minimum wealth of at least $25.5 million per household.40 Because these 
levels are estimated using a variety of methods, including estate tax data, the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and the Forbes 400 list, we cannot say 
precisely what the income composition of this group is. But we can instead 
look at the 0.1% of households in terms of income, which is likely to have 
substantial overlap with the top 0.1% of wealth-holders. For this group, the 
largest single income component is capital gains, and the combination of 
capital gains, business income, and other forms of investment income (like 
interest and dividends) makes up roughly 70–75% of their total income.41 
The balance of wage income and investment income in the earnings of 
the ultra-wealthy has varied over time. In the last period of dramatic wealth 
and income inequality during the 1920s, salaries made up an even smaller 
share of the income of the ultra-wealthy than today. In the immediate post–
World War II period, investment and business income were relatively low, 
and so salary income made up a larger relative share of income. When 
inequality started to grow again in the late 1970s and 1980s, salary income 
was a big driver, leading some researchers to speculate that “superstars”—
 
Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519 (2016); Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across 
Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (2014). 
40 Saez & Zucman, supra note 39, at tbl. 2. Although there has been some debate about 
other estimates made by Saez & Zucman, most notably their revenue estimates for wealth 
tax proposals and their estimates for the overall distributional incidence of the entire tax 
system (see note __ infra), their estimates that we report above seem to be in a similar range 
to corresponding estimates made by other notable economists. For instance, Smith, Zidar, & 
Zwick, supra note 40, report that there are approximately 234,600 individuals in the top 
0.1%, and that these individuals control approximately 15.1% of national wealth, with a 
minimum wealth of approximately $16 million per individual.   
41 See, e.g., Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional 
National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 595–
96 (2018); Emmanuel Saez, Income and Wealth Inequality: Evidence and Policy 
Implications, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 7, 10-11 (2016); Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas 
Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 3, 53–
54 & fig. 3 (2011); Philip Stallworth, Let Me Tell You About the Rich. They Are Different 
from You and Me, Tax Vox blog, Tax Policy Center, 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/let-me-tell-you-about-very-rich-they-are-different-
you-and-me.  
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those who could demand huge payments for their skills, such as athletes, 
actors, and CEOs—were driving the increase in inequality.42 Since 2000, 
however, financial investment income, especially capital gains, has returned 
with a vengeance. Today we can comfortably say that the vast majority of the 
income of this ultra-wealthy group is earned from their financial capital rather 
than their human capital.43   
If we narrow further to examine the top 0.01% of wealth-holders, these 
17,500 households own wealth of at least $120 million per household, with 
an average wealth of around $365 million. Saez and Zucman estimate using 
SCF data that the reported income of this group averages $11.6 million 
annually, but they say that is under-reported by about 50% given typical 
returns on wealth.44 We can safely assume that all or nearly all of the under-
reported income is from investment, given typical avoidance and evasion 
strategies. Moreover, given these wealth levels, we can reasonably assume 
that the income generated by that wealth swamps whatever these taxpayers 
might be earning from salary or wages.45  
Ultimately, then, the story of the ultra-wealthy is a story of (a) enormous 
holdings of wealth and (b) the dominance of income from that wealth—that 
is, investment income—over income from salaries and wages. These first-
order facts make the ultra-wealthy different from the vast majority of 
taxpayers, who generally have low or even negative wealth and who earn 
virtually all of their income from salaries and wages. 
B. How the Income Tax is Broken 
The income tax is broken because of its reliance on realization—that is, 
that most income from the appreciation of assets is only taxed when it is 
realized through a sale or exchange of those assets. For most taxpayers, 
realization is of little import, since they have few appreciated assets, and what 
they have is already shielded from taxation anyway.46 But for the ultra-
 
42 See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 
(1981). 
43 To be clear, portions of measured capital gains and returns to wealth holdings may 
result at least in part from these taxpayers’ labor efforts (think, for instance, of a superstar 
investor like Warren Buffet skillfully selecting stocks). Nevertheless, the key point for our 
purposes is that most of the economic income of the ultra-wealthy is earned in forms that our 
existing tax system deals with very poorly, rather than in the form of salaries and wages 
which our existing tax system deals with quite successfully. 
44 See Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 38, at tbl.3. 
45 Even a relatively modest 3% return on wealth of $345 million would generate 
$10,350,000 of income in a year. Only in extreme cases does labor income approach that 
level. 
46 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 501(a) (exempting, inter alia, qualified pension plans from 
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wealthy, whose income comes via the accumulation of financial assets, 
realization is central. 
Because of the realization-based nature of the income tax, the ultra-
wealthy—though not only them—can take advantage of tax planning 
strategies that defer and then reduce or even wipe out the personal-level tax 
on investment income. Some strategies for accomplishing this are 
sophisticated and aggressive, especially the use of offshore funds.47 But even 
relatively simple strategies can be very effective. We describe them below to 
illustrate that the income tax’s failure to tax the ultra-wealthy is based not 
(only) on obscure financial engineering, but rather on basic, core features of 
the income tax that have been with us for over 100 years.  
 
1. Strategy 1: Defer Realization of Gains 
 
The simplest strategy of all is to simply not sell any appreciated assets—
and to thereby not realize any taxable investment income from those assets—
at least for a time.48 The income tax applies only to realized gains, and so 
avoiding realization means avoiding tax on that investment income. To be 
clear, the appreciation in an asset is economic income regardless of whether 
the asset is sold or not.49 But because the income tax only recognizes the 
income upon a sale, reported investment income, and resultant taxes 
collected, dramatically understates the amount of true economic income 
taxpayers derive from investment.50 Even though market investment returns 
 
taxation), 121 (excluding from gross income up to $500,000 of gain from the sale of a 
principal residence).  
47 For a relatively easy to understand explanation of how this works, see Matt Levine, 
Taxes, Hedge Funds and an Incident, BLOOMBERGVIEW, Dec. 30, 2015, (“That's the basic 
idea of the ‘income defense industry,’ just finding places to point money-generating 
machines that won't generate present taxation. That's how the Bermuda-reinsurance thing 
works; it transforms a money-generating machine (a hedge fund) from immediate income 
into capital appreciation.”), available at http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-12-
30/taxes-hedge-funds-and-an-incident.  
48 Investment income can also come from dividends, interest, and similar payments that 
don’t benefit from the realization rule. However dividends in particular are increasingly out 
of favor. Many corporations have replaced dividends with stock buy-backs, as stock buy-
backs allow a corporation to effectively distribute corporate-level earnings to shareholders 
while triggering less shareholder-level tax. See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel and Gregg D. Polsky, 
There’s a Problem With Buybacks, But It’s Not What Senators Think, 162 TAX NOTES 765 
(2019). There are also non-tax corporate finance reasons to favor buybacks. See Alex 
Edmans, The Case for Stock Buybacks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-case-for-stock-buybacks.  
49 See, e.g., HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME 
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).  
50 As is typical in the academic tax literature, we use the terms “true” income, “real” 
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are generally in the range of 7 to 8 percent (and likely higher for the ultra-
wealthy51), reported taxable returns of the ultra-wealthy are around 1 to 2 
percent.52 We can thus estimate that most ultra-wealthy taxpayers only ever 
realize as taxable income less than a quarter of their true investment income.53 
Moreover, it is well-understood by tax scholars, analysts, and others—
 
income, and “economic” income—all interchangeably—to refer to Haig-Simons income 
(which includes unrealized appreciation). For elaboration, see Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing 
Wealth Seriously, supra note 2, at 314–17. 
51 See C. Eugene Steuerle, Taxes, Government Transfers and Wealth Inequality, THE 
MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW, First Quarter 2019 18–20 (“The tendency to accrue capital 
gains but not expose them to taxation is especially relevant for those who accumulate great 
wealth. On average, they (or some ancestor) became rich by performing two somewhat 
uncommon acts. First, they saved (or invested through borrowed dollars) a much larger than 
average share of their income. Second, they achieved returns on their net investments that 
were well in excess of the average real rate of return of 6 or 7 percent enjoyed by the typical 
stock investor.”). 
52 Jenny Bourne et al., More Than They REALIZE: The Income of the Wealthy, 71 NAT’L 
TAX J. 335, 336 (2018) (“Taxable returns to capital in our sample were even lower; in the 
aggregate, taxable returns were less than 3 percent and the predominant rate was in the 1 to 
2 percent range.”). 
53 Id. at 352 (“Consider individuals who received a 7 percent real return [and even higher 
nominal return] on their capital in the long term. Assume that for tax purposes they are among 
the majority shown here who reported taxable income of only 2 percent or less.”). For a 
discussion of the anecdotal and more inferential evidence supporting that this estimate, see 
McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 2, at 329–31. Using more conservative 
assumptions, Saez and Zucman estimate that “top wealth holders have a fiscal income that 
is slightly less than half of their true economic income (defined as wealth times the average 
macroeconomic return to wealth).” This estimate is larger than the 2/7ths estimate from 
Bourne et al., id., both because Saez and Zucman use more conservative estimates for the 
share of wealth reported as taxable income and because they then multiply this by “the 
average macroeconomic return to wealth” (which is lower than the 7 percent real return 
estimate used by Bourne et al.); Saez & Zucman, Progressive Wealth Taxation, supra note 
38, at 20. Because Saez and Zucman purposefully err on the side of caution in the sense of 
biasing their estimates to the low end of the plausible range, we think the Bourne et al. 
estimates are probably more accurate, but this difference is not especially important for this 
article’s purposes. Consider Steuerle’s discussion in Individuals Pay Very Little Individual 
Income Tax on Capital Income, supra note 13, “[the Bourne et al. estimates] are similar to 
what I found in a study covering the more inflationary 1970s. In yet another study, I found 
that a select group of owners of businesses and farms subject to estate tax reported even 
lower taxable returns. And in a book published in the early 1980s, I showed how net income 
from capital reported on all individual tax returns was less than one-third of total capital 
income in the economy. Keep in mind, regardless of what they report on tax returns, top 
wealth holders often achieve very high actual returns on their assets. The merely wealthy 
commonly earn stock market returns of 7 to 10 percent per year, while truly rich investors 
often attained that status by earning even more. Warren Buffett revealed in one income tax 
return that he recognized only about 1/50 of 1 percent of his wealth as taxable income even 
though his primary asset, Berkshire-Hathaway stock, had been earning about 10 percent 
annually.” 
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including the ultra-wealthy themselves—that even just deferring the 
realization of investment income lowers the effective tax rate on that income. 
This is because deferring tax on investment income allows the taxpayer to 
keep and continue to earn returns on what would otherwise have been the 
taxes paid.54 Thus, even to the extent that a taxpayer eventually does pay tax, 
she still keeps the after-tax profits from that interim investment—the taxpayer 
literally can generate additional after-tax income just by deferring tax 
payments.55 
 
2. Strategy 2: Never Realize Gains 
 
Deferring gains generates a tidy return for owners of wealth even if 
eventually a gain is realized and taxes fully paid. But we can go further, 
following not selling with never selling—that is, passing appreciated assets 
to heirs at death. At that point, our tax law allows a “step up” in basis to the 
assets’ fair market values.56 This wipes out any unrealized, built-in gain in 
the assets when they pass to the taxpayer’s heirs.  
For the ultra-wealthy, who often do not consume more than a small 
fraction of their wealth during their lifetimes, this is especially important—
the tax law essentially subsidizes the accumulation of large, dynastic wealth. 
In theory, the estate tax was intended to mitigate this, by taxing the transfer 
of wealth at death.57 But sophisticated estate planning techniques and 
political erosion of the tax itself means that the estate tax today is just 
something else to be planned around, with minimal impact on wealth 
accumulation.58 
 
54 To see this simply, suppose a person has some income in Year 1 that would generate 
a tax T if paid in Year 1. If instead, the person could defer paying T until Year 2, that would 
be the present value equivalent of 𝑇 (1 + 𝑟)⁄  in Year 1, where r is the standard discount rate 
(e.g., a risk-free rate of return). The intuition is that the person could invest 𝑇 (1 + 𝑟)⁄  in 
Year 1 to generate T in Year 2 and then pay the tax owed. If the person could defer paying 
the tax for n years, the present value of the tax becomes 𝑇 (1 + 𝑟)!⁄ , and thus approaches 
zero as n gets larger. For example, if the Year 1 tax would have been $100, but can be 
deferred for 20 years, and the discount rate is 5%, the present value of the tax becomes just 
$38—a person only needs to set aside $38 in Year 1 rather than $100. 
55 Continuing the example in the prior footnote, another way to see the intuition is that 
the $100 of deferred tax could grow to $265 in 20 years if invested at a 5% return. In 20 
years, the person would still have to pay the original $100 tax, plus a share of the $165 in 
growth—but they would still be left with $165(1 – t) after taxes. 
56 I.R.C. § 1014. 
57 For further discussion of the connection between the estate tax and the stepped-up 
basis provision, see infra Subsection III.C.3.  
58 Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 13, at 326 (“the gift and 
estate or unified wealth transfer tax system is not taxing wealth seriously. The estate tax has 
long been essentially a ‘voluntary tax,’ as it was dubbed in 1977. It is easily avoided with 
fairly standard planning techniques.”). 
[9-Mar-21] Tax Now or Tax Never 17 
 
3. Strategy 3: Consume from Untaxed Gains 
 
But what about the share of wealth that a taxpayer does consume during 
her lifetime, and thus cannot be passed to heirs? Again, there are relatively 
simple strategies to reduce or negate the effective tax on any investment 
income that is used to fund consumption. To begin with, the taxpayer could 
engage in “tax-loss harvesting,” which simply means offsetting any realized 
gains with realized losses, so as to reduce or negate the net capital gains tax.59 
For a wealthy taxpayer with a diverse portfolio, there will likely always be at 
least some losses to selectively realize, even when the portfolio as a whole is 
well in the black.60 Due to advances in financial technology and the rise of 
“robo-advisers,” these strategies are now widely available and used even by 
retail investors.61 
Going further, the taxpayer can engage in what Edward McCaffery has 
called the “buy, borrow, die” strategy.62 If an ultra-wealthy taxpayer needs 
more money to fund consumption than can be generated through tax-loss 
harvesting, she can simply borrow that money, pledging the appreciated 
assets that she earlier bought (or created). This borrowing typically comes at 
some cost, but at current interest rates (especially from a bank that is probably 
very happy to have other business from the ultra-wealthy and their 
businesses), that cost can be very low, especially relative to the tax cost of 
realization. Moreover, the debt can then later be paid back after death by 
selling assets that, at that time thanks to section 1014, can be sold without 
generating any taxable income.63 The overall result is a complete negation of 
all income tax on investment income, even if that income is transformed into 
cash to fund consumption. 
 
4. Other Strategies 
 
Section 1014 and its step-up in basis at death are not the only way to wipe 
 
59 See e.g., Eric D. Chason, Taxing Losers, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 541, 545 (2016). 
60 Plus, sophisticated taxpayers often go further to engage in tax-loss “farming,” which 
involves planning investments in advance so as to increase the likelihood that there will later 
be sufficient losses for tax-loss harvesting, and without significantly reducing the expected 
return on the entire investment portfolio. See e.g., Fidelity Viewpoints, How to invest tax-
efficiently: Create a strategy to help manage, defer, and reduce federal taxes. FIDELITY (Jan. 
31, 2020), https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/investing-ideas/tax-strategy.  
61 See, e.g., Shomesh E. Chaudhuri, Terence C. Burhnam, and Andrew W. Lo, An 
Emperical Evaluation of Tax-Loss-Harvesting Alpha, 76 Fin’l Analysts J. 99, 99–100 
(2020). 
62 McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 13, at 306. 
63 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
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out tax on investment income entirely. Another major tool is the ability to 
donate appreciated assets to charity—including to the taxpayer’s private 
foundation—and to thereby get a deduction for the full fair market value 
without having to realize any capital gain on those assets. Of course, in this 
case the wealth also leaves the person’s hands as a legal matter. But if the 
cash is held by a private foundation the donor can still spend that wealth on 
the matters and issues they care about, without ever paying any income tax 
on that wealth as it accumulated. Moreover, by combining this strategy with 
valuation-based gaming, many ultra-wealthy taxpayers succeed in cancelling 
out tax on much larger amounts of income than just the assets donated to 
charity.64   
The strategies go on and can become much more sophisticated, and often 
more aggressive, sometimes crossing the line to become outright tax evasion, 
for example through marketed tax shelters and the like.65 But, at base, these 
strategies nearly all rely on deferral in one way or another—devising 
techniques for the ultra-wealthy to defer realizing net capital gains, and 
ideally to defer any realization enough into the future that any gain can 
ultimately be wiped out. 
To be clear, strategies for negating tax on investment income are not 
limited to the ultra-wealthy. Indeed, many banks and investment advisors 
now market “securities-backed lines of credit” to the merely rich as well, to 
make the “buy, borrow, die” strategy explained above more accessible.66 But 
what separates the ultra-wealthy for our purposes is not just that they have 
access to particularly sophisticated investment and tax strategies (though they 
do), but rather the overwhelming dominance of investment income as a share 
of their total income—this fact makes even these plain-vanilla strategies 
especially powerful and dramatically lowers the effective tax rate on their 
total income.67 
 
64  See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Reforming the Charitable Contribution Substantiation 
Rules, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 275, 281–84 (2013). 
65 See, e.g., David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, 
Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 364–65 (2014) (“There are numerous 
variations on these sorts of distortionary responses, and they can often be very complicated—
especially when the responses take advantage of partnership tax rules or the rules governing 
the taxation of financial products.”); Del Wright Jr., Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter 
Promoters Use Financial Products to Bedevil the IRS (And How the IRS Helps Them), 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611 (2013) (discussing the recent history of tax shelters, and other very 
aggressive tax planning strategies employed by the ultra-wealthy, and the difficulties the IRS 
has faced in policing such shelters and strategies). 
66 See, e.g., Jordan Wathen, Wall Street’s Hottest Loan Product: Borrow Against Your 
Stocks, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Nov. 19, 2017, 
https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/11/19/wall-streets-hottest-loan-product-borrowing-
agains.aspx.  
67 See supra note 52. 
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Ironically, the ability for taxpayers to easily reduce the amount of their 
investment income subject to tax is also the primary justification for why we 
have lower tax rates on capital gains than on ordinary income. If the tax rate 
were higher, taxpayers would be expected to engage in even more tax 
planning and realize even fewer gains, such that tax revenue could drop.68 
Due to these preferential rates, average tax rates on reported income of the 
top 0.1% are actually lower than they are for the next richest cohort,69 and 
this is even before we account for the tax benefit of using deferral to avoid 
reporting other income.  
One advantage of investment income thus begets a second advantage, 
compounding the preferences for the ultra-wealthy. As we will elaborate, 
below, this is a key aspect of how the manner in which the personal income 
tax is broken with respect to the ultra-wealthy undermines the integrity and 
administrability of the entire tax system, as it applies to ordinary taxpayers 
and not just to the ultra-wealthy. And at the end of the day, this all flows back 
to realization and the ability to defer taxation of investment income. To 
meaningfully tax the ultra-wealthy, we must thus counteract this “original 
sin” of the tax system—we must end deferral.70 
 
II. THE HIGH COSTS OF FAVORING THE ULTRA-WEALTHY 
 
In Part I we explained how a basic feature of the U.S. income tax—its 
reliance on realization for the taxation of investment income—facilitates tax 
planning strategies that use deferral to lower, and even erase, the amount of 
that tax. In Part III, we will explain why ending deferral requires a current-
assessment reform, that is, one that imposes tax now, rather than a future 
equivalent. But first, we explain here in more detail why the problems of 
deferral and favoring the ultra-wealthy are not just matters of simple fairness, 
but rather implicate the integrity of the entire tax system. In other words, even 
if we agree that the income tax is broken, how broken is it? 
 
68 See, e.g., Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 11, at 14 (“That is, above a tax rate on 
capital gains of roughly 30 percent, the Treasury would begin to lose revenues because 
taxpayers would respond by deferring realizing gains for much longer periods of time.”); 
McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 2, at 331-34.  
69 Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Number of Returns, Shares of Adjusted 
Gross Income (AGI) and Total Income Tax Rates, tbl. 1 (Oct. 2018), available at: 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-rates-and-tax-shares. See 
Internal Revenue Service, The 400 Individual Income Tax Returns Reporting the Largest 
Adjusted Gross Incomes Each Year: 1992-2014, at 13 (Dec. 2016), available at: 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-top-400-individual-income-tax-returns-with-the-
largest-adjusted-gross-incomes; Batchelder and Kamin, supra note 11, at 4. 
70 Gerard M. Brannon, Tax Loopholes As Original Sin: Lessons From Tax History, 31 
VILL. L. REV. 1763, 1772 (1986).  
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Here we discuss ways in which the realization doctrine and deferral create 
harmful consequences for the income tax as whole. In explaining these 
consequences, we also lay the groundwork for why a current-assessment 
reform is required. In particular, we discuss below how the realization 
doctrine leads to substantially lower tax revenue, unfairness and injustice in 
the relative treatment of different groups of taxpayers, economic inefficiency 
and waste, and tax system complexity and unadministrability. In broad 
strokes, these are the core failings of the entire tax system, and they can each 
be connected back to the realization doctrine and the resulting favoring of the 
ultra-wealthy. 
 
A. Lost Tax Revenues 
 
We begin with the simple math. For many years, scholars have been 
predicting that the U.S. federal government would need “substantially higher 
levels of tax revenues” even just to fund ongoing government operations,71 
and these needs have been exacerbated by the reduced revenue and increased 
spending brought on by the recent economic downturn initiated by the 
coronavirus pandemic.72 A number of reforms have been proposed to raise 
revenue—including especially a Value Added Tax, which the United States 
is the only major industrialized country to lack. But large amounts of tax 
revenue could also come just from imposing tax on the ultra-wealthy 
commensurate with their levels of true income and wealth. 
As explained above, most of the income of the ultra-wealthy is income 
derived from their wealth holdings, and, as we have described, the U.S. tax 
system does a very poor job of taxing that income. The combination of the 
ability to defer reporting income from their wealth holdings plus low 
statutory rates on the income that is reported means very low effective tax 
rates on the ultra-wealthy, well below what they pay on their income for 
wages and salaries. If, alternatively, the ultra-wealthy’s investment income 
were to be taxed at the same effective tax rates as their wage and salary 
income, how much additional tax revenue would that raise? 
As a starting point, Lily Batchelder and David Kamin estimate that a 2% 
wealth tax on the top 0.1% of tax households would raise $1.9–3.3 trillion 
over ten years, depending on the degree of tax avoidance. If expanded to the 
top 1%, this wealth tax could raise $3.5–6.7 trillion. For context, the 
 
71 Edward D. Kleinbard, Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
593, 599 (2017). See also Ari Glogower & David Kamin, The Progressivity Ratchet, 104 
MINN. L. REV. 1499, 1571 (2020). 
72 See, e.g., Andrew Van Dam, The U.S. has thrown more than $6 trillion at the 
coronavirus crisis. That number could grow. WASH. POST, (April 15, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/15/coronavirus-economy-6-trillion/. 
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Congressional Budget Office projects that the entire existing personal income 
tax will raise approximately $24.4 trillion over that same period, and that the 
entire existing corporate income tax will raise approximately $3.6 trillion.73 
A well-designed wealth tax could thus potentially increase revenues by more 
than the entire existing corporate income tax.  
Key, however, is that the tax be well designed. More limited reforms 
would fall short. For instance, Batchelder and Kamin estimate that the 
combined package of eliminating stepped-up basis, taxing accrued capital 
gains at death, and hiking the capital gains and qualified dividends tax rate to 
28% would raise only $290 billion over ten years. And they estimate that 
hiking the top ordinary income tax rate on income over $10 million from 37% 
to 70% (a near doubling of the top rate) would raise at most $320 billion over 
the same period.74 
Batchelder and Kamin also estimate that a partial mark-to-market tax on 
publicly-traded securities, combined with a retrospective capital gains tax on 
other assets, on the top 0.1% of taxpayers would raise $0.6–1 trillion over ten 
years, depending on the degree of tax avoidance (and $1.7–2.1 trillion if 
expanded to the top 1%).75 As we will discuss in Part III, we consider these 
reform packages to be flawed designs for mark-to-market style tax reforms, 
because they involve future assessment, in this case the retrospective capital 
gains tax component.76 Because “publicly-traded assets represent only about 
one-fifth of assets held by the top 1 percent,”77 relatively little tax would be 
currently assessed, which partially explains why their revenue estimates are 
less than for a full current-assessment wealth tax reform. Nevertheless, even 
if we view their estimates as just lower bounds on the revenue potential from 
a better-designed current-assessment reform, Batchelder and Kamin’s 
estimates still imply that the revenue potential from a well-designed current-
assessment reform would be large.  
 
B. Real and Perceived Unfairness 
 
The current failure to effectively tax the ultra-wealthy also violates basic 
fairness norms. First, this violates “vertical equity” principles, since the 
effective tax rates paid by the ultra-wealthy are likely less than the effective 
tax rates paid by the next richest taxpayers. Second, this violate “horizontal 
 
73 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, at 7 
(January 2020). 
74 Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 11, at 13 (the two estimates differ because the first 
is by comparison to current law and the second to current policy). 
75 Id. at 13. 
76 See infra Part III. 
77 Batchleder & Kamin, supra note 11, at 15. 
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equity” principles since the tax rates on the types of income earned by the 
ultra-wealthy, namely income generated by their wealth, are less than for 
other types of income, namely wage and salary income, even if earned by 
similarly wealthy individuals. Moreover, because these tax benefits are in 
part a function of tax planning, the most aggressive tax planners are rewarded 
with lower rates, even if they have the same income as other taxpayers. 
 
1. Vertical Equity 
 
We take as given that vertical equity demands that income taxes on 
individuals and households should be progressive or, at a minimum, 
proportional.78 We have already shown that effective tax rates on the true 
economic income of the ultra-wealthy (including unreported income) are 
quite low, lower than the tax rates paid by those who have a larger share of 
wage and salary income.79 But this is not the end of the analysis, since to truly 
judge the progressivity of the tax system, we may wish to also consider the 
effects of other taxes, especially the corporate and payroll taxes. 
Some of the investment income that benefits from the tax strategies 
described in Part I is subject to business-level taxes, especially the corporate 
tax, and that arguably ought to be taken into account in the overall level of 
tax paid by the ultra-wealthy. Doing so has the potential to change the 
analysis. In a simplistic model, today’s statutory corporate income tax rate 
and personal capital gains tax rate can be added together for a combined 
statutory rate of about 37% on shareholder income earned through a 
corporation, almost equal to the top statutory rate on ordinary wage and salary 
income.80 If that were the end of the analysis, the income of the ultra-wealthy 
would not appear to be preferred after all.  
But corporations, particularly large multinationals, have become very 
skilled at lowering their effective tax rates, sometime to 0%, despite often 
earning large accounting profits.81 Moreover, at least a portion of the burden 
 
78 See Daniel Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 
1222 (1989) (“Exactly what constitutes vertical equity is the subject of some dispute, with 
proportional and progressive tax systems being the principal competing conceptions.”).  
79 See infra Section I.B. 
80 If a corporation earned profits of x, it could distribute 0.79x after taxes. After paying 
the 20% tax on dividends, and individual shareholder would have 0.632x, i.e., have an 
effective tax rate of 36.8% on the corporate profits.  
Alternatively, expanding this calculation to include the impact of SECA and NIIT taxes 
yields a top all-in rate on income earned through a corporation of 39.8%, as compared to a 
top all-in rate of 40.8% on wage and salary income. See Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 11, 
at 5–6, for the details behind these calculations.   
81 According to the CBO, the effective corporate tax rate in the U.S. in 2012 was 18.6%, 
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of the corporate income tax is borne by other stakeholders in a corporate 
enterprise, especially by workers.82  
In addition, the effective tax rates on income invested through other types 
of entities and on other types of investments are often much lower. For 
instance, real estate investments, through the use of accelerated depreciation 
and debt financing, can typically achieve very low or even negative effective 
tax rates.83 Much pass-through income is now entitled to the new 20% 
deduction for qualified business income.84 And, as discussed, by deferring 
realization of income at the individual level, taxpayers can compound these 
benefits before finally realizing taxable income. 
Furthermore, if we are to take account of the corporate income tax, which 
most analysts consider to be at least somewhat progressive,85 then arguably 
we also should include payroll taxes and state and local taxes, which most 
analysts think are more regressive.86 Recent research by Emmanuel Saez and 
Gabriel Zucman examines a broad set of tax burdens and concludes that the 
all-in effective tax rate on the richest 400 households may actually be lower 
than the tax rate paid by the bottom half of the income distribution,87 even 
without fully accounting for unrealized capital gains.88 Their finding is 
 
at a time when the statutory rate for larger corporates was 35%--implying that the average 
corporation can cut the statutory rate nearly in half through planning. Congressional Budget 
Office, International Comparisons of Corporate Income Tax Rates, at 17 (March 2017), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/52419-
internationaltaxratecomp.pdf. 
82 Estimates vary, but a typical assumption is that about a quarter of the corporate tax is 
borne by labor, creditors, customers, and others. For instance, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office assume in their models that 25% of the 
corporate tax burden is on labor. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Modeling the Distribution 
of Taxes on Business Income, JCX-14-13 (2013); Congressional Budget Office, The 
Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2008 and 2009 (2012). 
83 See Calvin H. Johnson, The Private Advantage of Money-Losing Investments Under 
Cut-Rate Capital Gains, 55 TAX NOTES 1125, 1129 (1992). 
84 See I.R.C. § 199A. 
85 See Benjamin H. Harris, Corporate Tax Incidence and Its Implications for 
Progressivity, Tax Policy Center, November 2009, available at 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001349-
Corporate-Tax-Incidence-and-Its-Implications-for-Progressivity.PDF. 
86 There are real questions about whether and to what extent any of these other forms of 
taxation should be taken into account—including for the corporate income tax, which 
arguably mostly just reaches excess returns at the corporate level. However, a thorough 
discussion of these questions is beyond the scope of this Article. 
87 EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE RICH 
DODGE TAXES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY (2019); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, 
How to Tax Our Way Back to Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2019, https://nyti.ms/2M7DK6C.  
88 Martin A. Sullivan, Risking the Wrath of 900 Billionaires, 165 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 
398, 401–02 (2019) (explaining why Saez and Zucman’s estimates do not fully account for 
unrealized gains). 
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disputed,89 but even if the overall tax system turns out to be modestly 
progressive with respect to reported income, we still need to consider the 
dramatic benefits from unrealized gains, especially from the sort of dynastic 
wealth that can take advantage of the step-up in basis and “buy, borrow, die.” 
In all likelihood, that pushes the tax system back into regressive territory.   
 
2. Horizontal Equity 
 
The vertical equity analysis is not free from doubt. It is difficult to 
conclusively determine whether the tax system as a whole is progressive, 
proportional, or regressive—especially with respect to the ultra-wealthy. This 
is because of uncertainty about the distributional incidence of business-level 
taxes,90 because there is no clear dividing line between what should be 
considered part of the tax system as opposed to a part of other governmental 
programs,91 because of the difficulty of estimating the long-term magnitude 
of unrealized capital gains with any precision,92 and because of other murky 
methodological issues.93 Regardless, even if we assume, for the sake of 
argument, that the tax system as a whole is progressive with respect to the 
ultra-wealthy because of the corporate income tax, this does not imply the 
absence of substantial fairness violations, because the treatment of capital 
income still raises issues of horizontal equity, i.e., the requirement that like 
taxpayers be treated alike.94 
Effective tax rates on different forms of investment income differ wildly, 
with corporate equity investments potentially being taxed at relatively high 
effective rates (at least absent tax gaming) but with many other forms of 
investment income being taxed at much lower or even negative effective 
rates.95 Batchelder and Kamin show that the present value of the top possible 
marginal tax rates vary for a select set of common investment strategies from 
 
89 See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Are US Billionaires Really Paying A Lower Tax Rate 
Than Working People? Probably Not., FORBES (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2019/10/11/are-us-billionaires-really-
paying-a-lower-tax-rate-than-working-people-probably-not. 
90 See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, MODELING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES ON BUSINESS 
INCOME, (JCX-14-13) (Oct. 16, 2013.).  
91 See, e.g., EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT 
SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY (2016) (urging scholars and others to consider complete fiscal 
systems, not tax systems alone); Brooks, supra note 24, at 270–74 (on the mutability of the 
income concept, especially when considering government benefits). 
92 See Sullivan, supra note 87. 
93 See, e.g., McCaffery, Taxing Wealth Seriously, supra note 13, at 329–30 (discussing 
the sparse data on unrealized capital gains). 
94 See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The 
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 607 (1993). 
95 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
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a high of 40.8% to a low of 0%.96 Similarly, the Tax Foundation, a 
conservative think tank, estimated that—prior to the 2017 tax overhaul—the 
effective tax rates on investment income varied from as high as 38% (for 
some corporate equity) to as low as negative 6% (for some corporate debt), 
depending on how the investments were structured.97  
In addition to the efficiency and economic-distortion harms that we will 
elaborate below, this wide variance in effective tax rates on different forms 
of investment income results in a prima facie violation of horizontal equity.  
That is, even if we grant for the sake of argument that the corporate income 
tax makes the tax system as a whole progressive with respect to the ultra-
wealthy as a group, the widely different effective tax rates on different forms 
of investment income creates wide disparities in the effective tax rates facing 
individual members of the ultra-wealthy, with at least a substantial number 
of ultra-wealthy taxpayers thus almost certainly facing very low effective-
average tax rates from all sources combined. Moreover, as Batchelder and 
Kamin explain, “[i]t also means that, among the wealthy, the most aggressive 
tax planners are rewarded, while those who follow the letter and spirit of the 
law are penalized. Heirs to large fortunes are taxed especially lightly.”98 
 
3. The Consequences of Perceived and Real Unfairness 
 
The prior two subsections detailed the unfairness of providing tax 
preferences for the type of income earned by the ultra-wealthy—namely 
investment income—and also of the wide disparity in the tax treatment of 
different forms of investment income. We believe that this case is solid, 
almost inarguably so. But some may still push back, perhaps even by 
questioning the utility of thinking of “fairness” as a valid norm for 
policymaking.99 We address below other critiques more rooted in economic 
and administrative consequences. But, first, it is important to note that the 
public’s perception of unfairness may be as or even more important than a 
rigorous demonstration of unfairness itself, and also that the existence of 
unfairness can have serious negative social and political repercussions. 
If the public believes that the income tax system is biased against ordinary 
 
96 Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 11, at 5–7. 
97 Alan Cole, Interest Deductibility – Issues and Reforms, TAX FOUNDATION FISCAL 
FACT NO. 548, at 4 (May 2017) (“Debt-financed corporate capital has an effective rate of 
negative 6 percent, 44 percentage points lower than the rate on equity-financed corporate 
capitl”). These estimates were made prior to the 2017 tax overhaul, which reduced the 
statutory corporate income tax rate and thereby reduced the effective tax rate on corporate 
equity investment, so these estimates should not be taken as current but rather just as further 
indication of the wide disparity in the effective tax rates on different forms of investment.  
98 Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 11, at 8. 
99 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2006). 
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people and in favor of the ultra-wealthy, this may have very real 
consequences. And, indeed, there is reason to infer that the public’s 
awareness of how the income tax fails with respect to the ultra-wealthy 
actually undermines perceptions of fairness, harming both the public’s faith 
in the overall tax system and associated tax morale and compliance,100 and 
possibly also affecting views of the overall fairness of our economic and 
political system.101 For example, as Benjamin Friedman, among others, has 
argued, cultural breakdown and the rise of populism and reaction can often 
be connected to periods where masses of people felt that they did not share 
in a society’s prosperity, when they feared that their children would be worse 
off than themselves.102 
Moreover, even if one is still skeptical of the moral case for taxing the 
ultra-wealthy more, there are secondary consequences of a system that allows 
the ultra-wealthy to continue to accumulate wealth rapidly. For example, 
having extreme concentrations of wealth affects how and what kind of 
financial, economic, and investment decisions get made, and also affects 
politics and political influence. There is little doubt at this point that money 
has an enormous influence in politics, and when that money is concentrated 
in the hands of relatively few people, it can have negative effects on 
democracy, even to the degree of threatening our country’s democratic 
legitimacy.103  
Finally, the income tax is directly implicated in racial injustice. As Strand 
and Mirkay—among many others104—have explained, the federal income tax 
operates “directly to increase wealth inequality, deepening pre-existing 
historically-based racial wealth disparities.”105 Specifically, by heavily taxing 
wage and salary incomes, and only lightly taxing the returns to owning 
 
100 See, e.g., Erzo F. P. Luttmer, and Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 
149 (2014).  
101  See, e.g., ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 78–
84 (2007). 
102 See BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
(2006). 
103 On the relationship between extreme wealth and efforts to undermine democracy, 
see, e.g., NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL 
RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA (2018); JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2017). This 
relationship is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865–1914 (2002). 
104 E.g., Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Should the IRS Know Your Race? The Challenge of 
Colorblind Tax Data, 73 TAX LAW REVIEW 1, 39-41 (2019) (listing studies finding that tax 
policies have disparate racial outcomes); Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329 (2009). 
105 Palma Joy Strand & Nicholas A. Mirkay, Racialized Tax Inequity: Wealth, Racism, 
And The U.S. System of Taxation, 15 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y. 265, 266 (2020). 
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wealth, the tax system obstructs historically disadvantaged groups from 
building wealth and economic power while protecting the comparative 
economic power of historically advantaged groups that started accumulating 
wealth during more illiberal periods.106 This is another concrete harmful 
consequence of the unfairness engendered by the existing income tax.   
 
C. Economic Inefficiency and Waste 
 
Above, we noted the wide disparities in the effective tax rates facing 
different types of income and investment strategies, and we argued that this 
results in both revenue loss and prima facie fairness violations. We will now 
explain how this also causes inefficiencies and economic waste. In particular, 
we address the welfare costs associated with the choice to raise a relatively 
greater share of revenue from wage and salary income versus investment 
income, and the welfare costs of allowing taxpayers to use tax gaming 
strategies to opt in to lower effective tax rates. These two points are related 
to the issues raised in subsections A and B, respectively, but are nonetheless 
distinct analytically. 
First, note that if an additional dollar of tax revenue is needed, it is most 
efficient (from a welfare-economics perspective) to raise it from the source 
with the lowest marginal utility of wealth.107 That is, if the government wants 
$1000 more in tax revenue, it will have lower social cost to raise it from Bill 
Gates rather than from Bill Gates’s gardener. Taxing Gates an additional 
$1000 will have almost zero utility cost to Gates, but could meaningfully 
affect the utility, or well-being, of the gardener.108  
Extending this point, the policy choice to lightly tax investment and 
capital income implies a choice to more heavily tax labor income, like wages 
and salaries. As we have already explained, investment income is highly 
concentrated in the ultra-wealthy, and so taxing labor income more than 
investment income means, on average, taxing those with higher marginal 
utility of wealth rather than those with lower marginal utility, thus generating 
unnecessary economic inefficiency and loss of social welfare.109 
 
106 Id. at 279. 
107 See generally Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax 
Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011). 
108 See Peter Diamond & Emanuel Saez, The Case for Progressive Tax: From Basic 
Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 168–69 (2011). 
109 One can argue with the assumption of zero marginal utility of wealth for the ultra-
wealthy, in part because it may contradict the observed degree of effort many ultra-wealthy 
put into increasing their wealth yet more. A full accounting of the psychology of the ultra-
wealthy is beyond the scope of this Article, but we can note a few things. First, there are 
number of other utility benefits that flow from work, especially in prestigious positions or 
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Second, recall the range of effective tax rates on different types of 
income. The current top all-in effective federal tax rate is 40.8% for wage and 
salary income reported on a W-2, and is 39.8% for income that is first fully 
subject to the corporate income tax and is then also fully taxed at the personal 
level at the top capital gains rate (plus the NIIT surtax rate).110 The current 
top all-in effective federal tax rate is 23.8% for pass-through or other non-
corporate investment income that is characterized as long-term capital gains, 
and 20% if this income takes advantage of loopholes to avoid the NIIT and 
SECA surtaxes.111  
But these effective rates can become 0% if realization is deferred until 
after death (taking advantage of stepped-up basis) or if other strategies are 
used to eliminate the deferred tax on unrealized gains (such as if profits are 
shifted to tax havens in a manner that avoids GILTI).112 And commonly used 
tax-gaming techniques can reduce these top effective tax rates further, often 
yielding negative effective tax rates.113 Thus, standard tax planning strategies 
can yield tax savings of between twenty and forty cents on the pre-tax dollar, 
and maybe more.          
In light of this, what stops wealthy taxpayers from using strategies like 
“buy-borrow-die” even more than they currently do, so as to wipe out all 
personal-level tax on investment income (rather than stopping after just 
eliminating most of this tax)? Why do the ultra-wealthy pay any tax at all?  
The catch is that these tax gaming strategies come at a cost, and these 
costs generally increase as the strategies get more complicated and aggressive 
to cover more economic income.114 Examples of these costs of tax planning 
 
professions. Second, those who work hard primarily just to increase their wealth may see it 
more of as a “scorecard” in the game of life, so that ordinal ranking is more important than 
cardinal amounts. See generally, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WEIGHING THE 
COST OF EXCESS (2010). Third, to the extent some ultra-wealthy go out of their way to avoid 
taxes, it could also be that this group is particularly opposed to taxation qua taxation and so 
an appropriation of wealth through the tax system might cause excessive utility loss relatively 
to other kinds of wealth declines. See, e.g., KLEINBARD, supra note 91. Ultimately, these are 
empirical questions that might be interesting to answer, but which are not a first-order 
concern—that is, a benevolent social planner ought not to care too much about a utility loss 
from this small group of ultra-wealthy taxpayers, particularly if the planner “welfare 
weights” transfers to the least well-off, as most analysts assume. See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez 
& Stefanie Stancheva, Generalized Marginal Welfare Weights for Optimal Tax Theory, 106 
AM. ECON. REV. 24, 41 tbl. 2 (“social welfare weight” of nearly zero for highest income 
group); Diamond & Saez, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 168–69. 
110 Batchelder & Kamin, supra note 11, at 5–7. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.; Chason, supra note 59, at 545. 
114 Gamage, supra note 65, at 375–82. 
[9-Mar-21] Tax Now or Tax Never 29 
include lower liquidity,115 the costs of borrowing,116 transaction costs of tax-
loss harvesting,117 deviating from taxpayers’ risk-reduction and 
diversification preferences,118 the excessive complexity of more 
sophisticated forms of tax gaming, and the cost to businesses from using 
inefficient capital structures in order to generate tax savings.119 
As C. Eugene Steuerle explained in his seminal book on the topic, 
“insofar as capital income is concerned, the individual income tax is primarily 
a discretionary tax.”120 As a result, at least with respect to the investment 
income of the wealthy, the income tax is effectively just a tax on the 
limitations to tax gaming that deter wealthy taxpayers from gaming away all 
of their tax liabilities, so that “the discretionary income tax on capital income 
is a tax on liquidity, risk reduction, and diversification rather than a tax on 
income.”121   
The key takeaway here is that tax gaming typically involves real 
economic costs, and, at the margin, these costs should generally approach the 
effective marginal tax rates.122 While incurring these costs may be rational 
for individual taxpayers, it is exceedingly wasteful to an economy as a 
whole.123 In other words, the productive potential of the overall economy is 
diminished because scarce resources are devoted to tax gaming at the expense 
of productive investment and business activity. 
 
D. Complexity and Uncertainty in the Tax System  
 
Perhaps even more troublesome than the other sorts of harmful 
consequences explained above, the manner in which the personal income tax 
 
115 Because, e.g., it means not realizing gains and instead keeping profits invested in 
illiquid assets. 
116 Because, e.g., Larry Ellison–style credit lines charge interest. 
117 See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, TAXES, LOANS, AND INFLATION: HOW THE NATION’S 
WEALTH BECOMES MISALLOCATED 18–24 (Brookings Institution 1985). 
118 Id. 
119 Common examples of this include greater use of debt financing for tax purposes, 
when equity would be better for business purposes, or designing organizational structures, 
supply chains, and the like, through low-tax jurisdictions in a manner that increases business 
and organizational costs in order to generate tax savings. See Gergen, supra note 10, at 29–
30 (“It is insane to encourage talented people with useful skills to create complicated 
financial vehicles that serve no purpose other than avoiding [] tax”). 
120 STEUERLE, supra note 117, at 18. 
121 Id. at 19. We would add lack of complexity to Steuerle’s list, as we view the excessive 
complexity of tax-motivated investment strategies as perhaps the largest form of economic 
waste, because this complexity interferes with designing investment and business strategies 
so as to maximize economic productivity and related pre-tax returns.  
122 Gamage, supra note 65, at 375–82. 
123 Id; Glogower, supra note 22, at 122–23.  
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is broken and readily exploited by the ultra-wealthy’s tax gaming undermines 
the administrability and integrity of the entire tax system. Fully explaining 
how and why this is so is beyond the scope of this article.124 But the key point 
is that the realization doctrine, along with the corresponding capital gains 
preference, generate the lion’s share of legal complexity and uncertainty in 
the income tax, ultimately undermining the tax system itself. 
As noted above, because the realization doctrine makes deferring capital 
gain trivial, it is generally believed that a preferential rate on capital gain 
income is needed to reduce that disincentive to realize gains.125 This then 
creates a need to distinguish capital gains and capital losses from ordinary 
income and ordinary losses, and that task is a major source of uncertainty and 
confusion in the tax law.126 For instance, with respect to the important 
category of real estate transactions, a federal judge famously proclaimed it to 
be a “truism” that“[i]f a client asks you in any but an extreme case whether, 
in your opinion, his sale will result in capital gain, your answer should 
probably be, ‘I don't know, and no one else in town can tell you.’”127           
The muddled state of the law on distinguishing ordinary and capital 
income motivates wasteful tax planning, and, beyond that, creates large 
compliance burdens and traps for the unwary, including for small businesses 
and other more ordinary taxpayers (as opposed to just the ultra-wealthy).128 
As Reuven Avi-Yonah and Dmitry Zelik have explained, “a lot of the 
complexity of the current tax code results from attempts to block taxpayers 
from converting ordinary income to capital gains … and from the limitations 
on offsetting ordinary losses against capital gains, which has resulted in 
transactions designed to create artificial capital losses …”129 
Indeed, these harmful consequences are so severe that Avi-Yonah and 
Zelik argue that, if it is not possible to adopt a current-assessment reform to 
replace realization, then we should abandon the goal of increasing 
progressivity at the top and instead make the top tax rate 28% for both 
ordinary income and capital gains.130 This is because, they argue, 28% is the 
 
124 For related discussion, see Glogower, supra note 22, at 123–24. 
125 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
126 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Dmitry Zelik, Are We Trapped By Our Capital Gains?,  
U OF MICHIGAN PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 476 (2015). 
127 Byram v. U.S., 705 F.2d 1418, 1419 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Tony Nitti, Tax Geek 
Tuesday: Does The Sale Of Property Generate Ordinary Income Or Capital Gain?, FORBES, 
December 31, 2013 (“Some questions simply can’t be answered. For example … Will the 
sale of my property give rise to capital gain or ordinary income?”). 
128 E.g., Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 126; Nitti, supra.  
129 Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 126, at 17. 
130 It should be noted that the top marginal tax rate on ordinary income was the same as 
the top capital gains rate from 1988 to 1990, following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L. 
No. 99-514 §§ 101, 302, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096, 2218.  
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maximum rate that can be imposed on capital gains in a realization-based 
system and because the harms that result from the capital gains preference 
are so damaging as to make it not worth taxing ordinary income at a higher 
rate. In their framing, our only choices in a realization-based system are to 
either retain the preferential capital gains rate or slash the top rates on 
ordinary income. Despite their preference for “higher rates on the rich,” they 
“have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we are indeed trapped by our 
capital gains, that the current rate structure is indefensible in practice, and 
that we should revert to an overall rate of 28% for all income.”131 
For a related example, consider the difficulties of distinguishing between 
when payments from businesses to investors should be considered returns to 
investment as opposed to wages or other disguised payments for labor or 
services.132 Under current law, the personal capital gains preference and the 
various surtaxes like SECA and NIIT mean that the way payments from 
businesses to investors are characterized can yield quite different personal-
level tax consequences.133 This results in widespread tax gaming and major 
inefficiencies and inequities.134 
It is not an exaggeration therefore to say that the realization doctrine, 
along with the corresponding capital gains preference, significantly harms the 
integrity and functioning of the overall income tax system. In addition to 
opening the door to tax preferences that benefit the ultra-wealthy, the 
realization doctrine leads to excessive and unnecessary legal complexity and 
uncertainty affecting many more ordinary taxpayers. In the next Part, we 
explain why current-assessment reform is required to effectively tax the ultra-
wealthy, but it is an additional benefit that many current-assessment reforms 
would minimize or remove the need for a capital gain preference. 
 
III. THE NEED FOR CURRENT-ASSESSMENT TAX REFORM 
 
The previous two Parts explained how the realization doctrine and the 
availability of deferral have fundamentally broken our income tax, 
particularly with respect to its treatment of the ultra-wealthy, as well as 
explaining some of the harmful consequences of that failure. The clear 
solution is to end deferral. But how? 
With certain notable exceptions,135 the prior literature has mostly 
 
131 Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 126, at 4 
132 See Richard Winchester, Working For Free: It Ought To Be Against the (Tax) Law, 
76 MISS. L.J. 227, 258 (2006). 
133 See e.g., Richard Winchester, Carried Interest for the Common Man, 142 TAX NOTES 
1250 (2014); Winchester, supra. 
134 Id. 
135 See supra note 27. 
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embraced reforms that would seek to limit or end the financial benefits of 
deferral while still fully or partially retaining the realization doctrine—i.e., 
these reforms would not assess tax until a gain is realized through a sale or 
exchange, at least for some important categories of assets. For example, such 
a reform might postpone the assessment of tax on illiquid assets, such as 
shares in privately held firms, until those shares are sold, but would impose 
at that time an interest charge to offset the benefits of deferring the assessment 
until that time.136 
We argue here, however, that such future-assessment reforms are 
insufficient. To truly repair the personal tax system and meaningfully tax the 
ultra-wealthy on their economic income (or on any alternative comprehensive 
measure of wellbeing or ability to pay) a current-assessment reform is 
needed. That is, we need a reform that would assess and impose tax on a 
periodic basis as economic income accrues (or, alternatively, as wealth or 
spending power accumulates), rather than attempting to tax at some future 
date that may never actually occur. 
Section A below lays out our theory for the necessity of a current-
assessment reform. The key insight is that, although a future-assessment 
reform might theoretically cancel out the financial benefits of deferral under 
existing law, it is powerless against the effects of future political shifts. As a 
simple example of this point, consider that if a future-assessment reform is 
put in place, but a later political coalition repeals it before any gains are 
actually realized, it will have accomplished nothing. 
To clarify the difference between current-assessment and future-
assessment reforms, and why current assessment is superior, Section B 
discusses two leading future-assessment reforms, retrospective capital gains 
taxation and progressive consumption taxation.  
Section C then explores several prior real-world examples of the 
difficulties posed by political shifts. This review illustrates the centrality of 
political optionality to tax politics. Time and again, taxpayers have managed 
to undermine future-assessed taxes, and there is every reason to expect that 
this will generally be the fate of future-assessment tax reforms. 
A. Current Assessment: Tax Now or Tax Never 
We argue that meaningfully taxing the ultra-wealthy, and thereby 
beginning to repair our tax system, requires reform that is sufficiently robust 
 
136 For instance, the Ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee, Ron Wyden, 
recently proposed a reform of this sort (Sen. Ron Wyden, Treat Wealth Like Wages, available 
at 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Treat%20Wealth%20Like%20Wages%20R
M%20Wyden.pdf). We explain why this sort of future-assessment reform is likely to fail in 
Part III.B.1. infra. 
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against the possibility of future legal change. In particular, any reform must 
not rely on tomorrow’s Congress or executive agencies to ensure meaningful 
taxation of today’s income or wealth accumulations. In other words, what is 
needed is a current-assessment reform—we must tax now, not later.  
To sketch out our approach, consider the following thought experiment. 
Suppose that a political coalition enacts a reform with the goal of successfully 
taxing the ultra-wealthy. Further suppose that this reform will take effect 
across two time periods. In the first period, some economic income is earned, 
perhaps by appreciation in the value of an asset. In the second period, a tax is 
imposed on that first-period income which is the present-value equivalent of 
the first-period tax (had it been imposed). What happens by the time we reach 
the second period? 
There are essentially three possibilities. First is that the original reform 
coalition both remains in power and remains fully committed to bolstering 
the reform. As a result, this coalition is able to fend off political attacks 
against the reform while passing any necessary follow-up legislation or 
taking other necessary follow-up actions to reinforce the reform, as 
policymakers start to observe both the efficacy of the reform itself as well as 
taxpayer responses to it, many of which will likely have been unanticipated 
at the time of the initial enactment. 
A second possibility is that there is a complete shift to an opposing 
political coalition, and the new coalition then either fully repeals the reform 
or replaces it with a new regime that is more favorable to its supporters. 
The third possibility is that we could end up somewhere in the middle, 
with the original reform coalition either weakened or less committed to 
bolstering its initial reform, but with that original coalition retaining enough 
power and commitment to block its reform from being completely repealed 
or replaced. In this case, full repeal of the original reform is unlikely, but so 
is the incremental maintenance and adjustment that is required to make the 
original reform operate effectively.  
Our observation from past reforms, both tax and non-tax, is that the 
probability of the second and third possibilities together greatly outweighs 
the first.137 Indeed, we believe that the most likely outcome by far is the third 
possibility—a gradual erosion of the reform due to neglect because the 
original coalition is too weak to bring necessary incremental reforms in the 
face of taxpayer innovation, changing economic circumstances, and 
experience with the actual effects of the law.  
If this is the case, then there is a significant likelihood that any tax actually 
imposed in the second period will not in fact be the present-value equivalent 
of tax in the first period, even if that was the way the law was written, and 
 
137 See infra Section III.C. 
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this becomes increasingly likely the longer the length of time between the 
first and second periods. Of course, this outcome would obviously follow 
from a full repeal of the initial reform. But more likely is that the initial 
reform would just be eroded somehow—by taxpayers devising strategies in 
the interim period to game around the law; by economic conditions changing 
so that the assumptions underlying the initial reform no longer hold and in a 
manner that erodes the initial reform; by relatively minor changes to the 
initial law, well short of full repeal, that nevertheless undermine its intended 
effects, such as rate changes or new exemptions; by critical errors in the 
original law going uncorrected; and so on. While some tax may still be 
collected in the second period, the effective tax rates may be so reduced as to 
make deferral still very rewarding. 
Exacerbating all of this, sophisticated taxpayers can often anticipate and 
even influence the likelihood of these (favorable to them) outcomes. There is 
an option value to waiting, and for the ultra-wealthy, even minor erosions in 
the law could generate a huge return to deferral. The clear conclusion 
therefore is that reforms that rely on the imposition of tax in the second period 
are inferior to those that impose tax in the first time period—current 
assessment. Choosing to tax later risks taxing never.  
To fill out and formalize the theory, we need to introduce a few terms and 
concepts. We have already distinguished a current-assessment reform from a 
future-assessment reform. For purposes of our argument, we assume that 
either reform as drafted would impose the same present-value equivalent tax 
(in financial terms). The key difference is the timing of that assessment—tax 
now or tax later.  
In considering the benefits of deferral—of waiting—the prior literature 
mostly just considers what we label as the existing-law benefits of deferral, 
that is, the benefits that are encoded into existing law. These existing-law 
benefits of deferral can be further broken down into time-value benefits (that 
is, the financial benefits of deferring tax liabilities due to the time-value of 
money) and loophole benefits (that is, the ways under current law that 
taxpayers can reduce or completely wipe-out deferred tax liabilities, such as 
the Section 1014’s step up in basis on death). Most leading reform proposals 
aim to eliminate one or both of those benefits.138 
But there is another benefit of deferral: the ability to wait for favorable 
legal or political change. We label this the political optionality benefit of 
deferral. If there is some chance that a reform could erode or be repealed in 
 
138 With respect to loophole benefits, this has mostly consisted of calling for the end of 
existing loopholes like Section 1014. With respect to time-value benefits, the prior literature 
has proposed reforms that would eliminate time-value benefits by taxing deferred liabilities 
upon realization, such as by imposing an interest charge to offset the time-value benefits. 
See supra note 18. 
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the future—and, with future-assessment reforms, there always is—then there 
will still be incentives to defer realization of gain, even if the tax on that gain 
would be the present-value equivalent of a current tax, were it to be assessed. 
In other words, if there is some non-zero probability of a taxpayer-favorable 
future legal change, then this lowers the expected value of that future tax 
below the present-value equivalent. Put yet another way, options have real 
value, as any financial professional would tell you, and the possibility of 
future legal change gives the ultra-wealthy that option for free.139 Both 
historical experience and political theory strongly imply that the ultra-
wealthy are likely to take advantage of options to defer their tax liabilities so 
as to then wait for more favorable political or legal changes. 
To be sure, current-assessment reforms are also at risk of future erosion 
or repeal, and there is no guarantee that future political change will be 
favorable to the ultra-wealthy. But institutional, political, and economic 
realities put a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the ultra-wealthy, when it 
comes to future-assessment reforms, thus giving political optionality a 
positive value. Of course, it is theoretically possible that a current-assessment 
reform could be reversed in the future, along with taxpayers then being given 
refunds for any tax previously paid. However, as we will explain, this is 
dramatically less likely to occur as compared to a future-assessment reform 
being eroded or terminated prior to the assessment of tax. We will now 
proceed to elaborate three sets of pressures that all add up to creating large 
political optionality benefits with respect to future-assessment reforms. 
 
1. Policy Drift and the Need for Incremental Bolstering 
 
The standard view of the U.S. federal legislative process is that it features 
a heavy status quo bias—that is, major policy reform of any kind is extremely 
difficult.140 The typical explanation for this is that the U.S. system features a 
high number of “veto” or “pivot” points.141 That is, in order for legislation to 
 
139 Or almost free—other costs, like costs of borrowing or of non-diversification are real, 
but relatively minor (inframarginally) relative to the tax benefits. See Steuerle, supra note 
13. 
140 See, e.g., LANE KENWORTHY, SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AMERICA 169–76 (2014); JACOB 
S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE 
RICH RICHER—AND TURNS ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 83–87 (2010); NOLAN 
MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF 
IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 165-66 (2006); SARAH BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 67–75 (2003). 
141 See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND 
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 72–74 (2012); HACKER & PIERSON, supra, at 83–87; KEITH 
KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 20–28 (1998); George 
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be enacted, it has to get past a number of hurdles. For example, at various 
points in the legislative process, the House Speaker, the median House 
Member, the Senate Majority Leader, the 60th Senator, the President, and the 
34th Senator and 146th House Member (for overcoming a Presidential veto) 
all could have the power to stop a piece of legislation.142 Because these 
individuals may occupy very different points on the ideological spectrum, it 
is exceedingly hard to design a major reform that can overcome all the pivots. 
Moreover, a reform that can get over all of these veto points is likely to 
be somewhat unstable. As Jason Oh has argued, if a large reform package is 
a product of negotiation and compromise, it may contain individual policies 
that would not have had sufficient support to pass on their own—that are only 
passed because of political horse-trading.143 However, if those policies can 
be legislatively decoupled after passage, then one or more of them is at risk 
of repeal or change, even if the other parts of the reform stay in place. 
This helps to explain why the U.S. typically experiences policy drift—
that is, why legislated policies tend to evolve somewhat organically over 
time, often without clear action by legislators. This sort of policy drift can 
take a number of forms, which are worth isolating for clarity.  
First, there is the sort of incremental repeal that Oh explains—whereby 
legislators might find sufficient support to make small changes that serve to 
partially undermine a larger reform package.144  
Second, a legislated policy might remain static, but with the underlying 
economic or other conditions changing in a manner that impacts the policy’s 
effectiveness. This second dynamic is especially likely to occur in the context 
of distributional policies, tax or otherwise, and to gradually undermine the 
 
Tsebelis, Decision Making in Poliical Systems: Veto Players in Presidential, 
Parliamentarian, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 289, 316–19 
(1995) (policy stability in the U.S. related to number of “veto players”).  
142 See KREHBIEL, supra note 140, at 22–23; Jason Oh, The Pivotal Politics of 
Temporary Legislation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1055, 1060–61 (2015). 
143 Jason Oh, Will Tax Reform Be Stable?, 165 U. PENN. L. REV. 1159, 1183–86 (2017).  
144 For a concrete example, consider the “Cadillac” tax passed as part of the Affordable 
Care Act—an excise tax on expensive health care plans. The tax was included for two 
reasons. One, to try to offset the tax benefit of the exclusion for employer-provided health 
care by clawing back the tax benefit of the exclusion for the highest earners. Two, the tax 
was a revenue-raiser to ensure that the ACA got a favorable budget score from the 
Congressional Budget Office. For both these reasons, it was meant to be an important part 
of the original compromise of the ACA. Yet, the Cadillac tax was repealed before it ever 
took effect. Once it could be peeled off from the full ACA, it became unpopular and unstable, 
and thus subject to incremental erosion and then repeal. Compared to the original design of 
the ACA, that repeal had the effect of shifting the costs of the ACA away from the relatively 
well-off taxpayers who tend to have these sorts of high-value health plans. 
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distributional impact of such policies.145 As we discuss below, this is a key 
aspect of the story of stepped-up basis—a policy that had some logic in 1921, 
but then remained in place even as other policy changes and developments 
later destroyed that logic. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, policy drift can occur in the form 
of bureaucratic drift—that is, where the legislation itself remains static, but 
with regulators and others in federal agencies affecting the resulting policy in 
other ways.146 In most cases, regulators’ ability to move policy is real but 
limited. Major reform is unlikely to come from only an executive agency, but 
smaller changes are possible and are often unlikely to be checked by 
Congress. This is because stopping this sort of bureaucratic drift may require 
Congress to pass new legislation (unlikely, for all the reasons discussed 
above), individuals to engage in successful litigation (which is risky, 
expensive, and delayed), or voters to change the party controlling the 
presidency.  
On its own, this story of status quo bias and policy drift does not indicate 
which way a policy will drift. If drift were random, it might be just as likely 
for the original reform to become stronger, rather than weaker. Alas, history 
and theory suggest otherwise, particular in the case of policies—tax and non-
tax—that focus on issues related to inequality and distribution.147 The nature 
of distributional policies is that they typically have concentrated harms (on 
the wealthiest) but diffuse benefits (on the rest of the population)—a dynamic 
that is well known to produce lopsided outcomes.148 We should thus expect 
that both acts and failures to act will generally be more likely to benefit the 
already well-off at the expense of the less well-off.  
Moreover, policy drift in favor of the wealthiest is especially likely the 
more that important aspects of the policies in question are too complicated to 
be well understood by the general voting public or communicated to the 
 
145 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 140, at 43–44 & 52–54; Jacob Hacker, Privatizing 
Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy 
Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243, 246–49 (2004). 
146 E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of 
Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. 
Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246–47 (1987). See also Sloan G. Speck, Tax Planning and Policy 
Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 549 (2016) (explaining tax planning drift as another form of policy 
drift on top of bureaucratic drift). 
147 HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 140, at 52–54; GILENS, supra note 141, at 79–80 
(showing asymmetry of government responsiveness to policy preferences of rich and poor); 
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA 32 (“[T]he [political] pressure system has an upper-class bias.”) (1960). 
148 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTION ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971). 
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voting public via mass media.149 The history of U.S. tax administration is rife 
with examples of important, but complicated details of the tax system drifting 
in a manner that favors the wealthiest. Some of these examples include 
Congress legislating such changes,150 but many are based on regulators at 
Treasury or IRS revising interpretations of the tax code to favor the 
wealthiest,151 or the failure to block new forms of tax gaming that undermined 
the effect of the rules to the benefit of the wealthiest.152 
Because the costs of tax policies aimed at the wealthiest are concentrated, 
and the benefits diffused, there is a heightened hurdle to achieving any 
reforms that would meaningfully tax the wealthiest. But this hurdle can be 
overcome to the extent that the reforms in question are sufficiently popular 
with the overall voting public. Yet for this popularity to matter, the voting 
public must understand the policies in question at least well enough to reward 
politicians and other political actors supporting such policies and to penalize 
politicians and other political actors opposing them. Consequently, the more 
complicated and difficult to understand are the policies in question, the less 
likely it is that public opinion can effectively counteract the concentrated 
political power wielded by the wealthiest who would suffer the costs of 
 
149 See Hacker, supra note 145, at 252 (on “incremental” and “subterranean” policy drift 
in favor of the wealthy). 
150 The 2017 tax overhaul is a notable example of this, see David Kamin, David Gamage, 
Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. 
Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro, & Manoj 
Viswanathan, The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, And Glitches Under The 
2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439 (2019). Consider also the expansions of 
section 179 and subsection 168(k), as discussed in: MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON & DAVID 
GAMAGE, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING, AND POLICY at 342-43 (3rd ed., Carolina Academic 
Press, 2019).  
151 E.g., Livingston & Gamage, supra note id., at 340–41 (explaining how the so-called 
“repair regulations” revised tax law to the substantial benefit of well-off taxpayers); Calvin 
Johnson, Destroying the Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99 
TAX NOTES 1381 (2003) (explaining how the Treasury Department revised the rules 
governing capitalization of intangibles to favor wealthy taxpayers); STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMM. ON TAX’N, REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP ISSUES 
(JCS-6-97) 13–17 (April 9, 1997) (noting doubt about legal authority for Treasury to issue 
the check-the-box regulations, Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3); Brant J. Hellwig & Gregg D. 
Polsky, The Employment Tax Challenge to the Check-the-Box Regulations, 111 TAX NOTES 
1039, 1039 & n.1 (2006) (same, and collecting citations). But see Littriello v. U.S., 484 F.3d 
372 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding check-the-box regulations).  
152  Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633 (2017) 
(explaining that and why the Treasury Department only minimally uses its powers to support 
revenue raising and instead generally acts in a revenue-losing manner); Brian Galle & 
Stephen Shay, Admin Law and the Crisis of Tax Administration (explaining why tax agencies 
are biased “against revenue and against the poor”) (incomplete draft of July 3, 2020, on file 
with authors and cited with permission).  
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distributional tax policies.153 
The dynamics of tax deferral are inherently complicated and difficult to 
convey to the voting public, as are the mechanics and effects of provisions 
like Section 1014’s step up in basis that can serve to negate tax following 
deferral. By contrast, the voting public typically finds it much easier to 
understand tax policies that raise revenue currently, and tax cuts offered with 
respect to such policies are typically more salient.154 
Overall, this picture of U.S. policymaking suggests that major reform is 
difficult and rare, and that when it happens, it will be at least partially 
undermined over time by policy drift, unless the original political coalition 
remains at its full strength and also retains its full initial commitment to the 
reform—which almost never happens. In the more likely scenario, party and 
ideological control will shift over time, opening the door to a gradual erosion 
of the original policy. And this is especially likely the more complicated and 
difficult it is to convey the essence of the reform to the general voting public. 
Consequently, for a major tax reform targeted at the ultra-wealthy to 
remain effective over time, it is crucial to implement as many key mechanics 
of the reform as possible at the time of enactment, or soon thereafter, while 
the original reform coalition still retains its strength and commitment. Future-
assessment tax reforms do the opposite. This is because putting off the actual 
assessment and collection of tax means also putting off the review of the tax 
gaming techniques that taxpayers will devise in their attempts to escape the 
tax, putting off the technical revisions and other administrative responses that 
will need to be made to correct the unanticipated difficulties that will 
inevitably arise as part of assessing and collecting tax, and, more generally, 
putting off the many administrative agency decisions required to effectuate 
tax assessment and collection. 
Effectuating a major tax reform requires more than just passing the initial 
legislation. Many crucial administrative decisions and technical corrections 
must be made at the time that taxes are actually assessed and collected. For 
 
153 It is important that current-assessment reforms, such as a wealth tax, are easier to 
explain to voters than future-assessment reforms, like retrospective capital gains taxation or 
repealing the step-up in basis, though that fact is not a function of political optionality. 
154 This is partially an artifact of budget rules, as explained further in subsection III.A.3 
infra. But this is also an artifact of the fact that definitions of income and of other tax-base 
measurements are inherently murky with respect to time, which makes it impossible to 
convey unambiguous and uncontroversial revenue or distributional information with respect 
to unrealized gains and other future-assessment components of tax systems. See Sullivan, 
supra note 88; Brooks, supra note 24. By contrast, it is relatively easy to measure the tax 
revenues actually paid (or expected to be paid) in any given year, which makes it relatively 
easy to communicate related information about these measurements to the voting public.  For 
a more extended discussion of factors affecting tax salience, see David Gamage & Darien 
Shanske, Three Essays On Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. 
REV. 19 (2011). 
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current-assessment tax reforms, this typically happens during or immediately 
following the reform being enacted, while the initial reform coalition 
typically maintains its full strength and commitment and while key 
administrative officials and staff are thus typically oriented toward bolstering 
the reform. By contrast, for future-assessment tax reforms, much of this 
typically happens later, potentially many years or even many decades later, 
by when the initial reform coalition will likely have lost at least some of its 
strength and commitment to the reform, and by when key administrative 
officials and staff are typically motivated more by the asymmetric pressures 
that tend to undermine distributive policies over time and motivated less by 
any remaining commitment to bolstering the tax reform.    
These dynamics make it dramatically more likely that a future-assessment 
reform will be eroded or undermined prior to the assessment of tax, especially 
as compared to the likelihood of a current-assessment reform being fully 
repealed with taxpayers then being given refunds for tax previously paid 
through a current-assessment reform. Whereas taxing now is relatively 
certain, taxing later is quite tentative.    
 
2. The Time Value of Options 
 
Embracing the political optionality metaphor literally, the longer the time 
to maturity of an option, the greater its value.155 For a financial option, the 
logic is that the longer the time until the option expires, the greater the 
likelihood that the option will end up “in the money,” i.e., with strike price 
greater than the spot price for put option, or vice versa for a call option.156 
Political optionality has the character of a put option. The taxpayer has an 
asset with built-in gain, and she could realize that gain today or tomorrow. If, 
because of a change in the tax regime, tomorrow’s after-tax price could be 
higher than today’s (all else equal), then a rational taxpayer could wait to 
see—and might even pay for the option of waiting.  
In the context of tax reform, a future-assessment tax, assessed at the 
present-value equivalent of a currently assessed tax, carries with it an option 
to wait for a more favorable regime.157 And, as with financial options, the 
longer the time until that future assessment, the greater the likelihood of a 
taxpayer-favorable change—for example, by waiting for a Congressional or 
Presidential election that shifts power in a taxpayer-favorable direction. If 
 
155 See, e.g., DAVID S. KIDWELL ET. AL., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND 
MONEY 323 (2017). 
156 Id. 
157 See Kamin & Oh, supra note 30, at 15; Alan J. Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation in 
the United States: Realizations, Revenue, and Rhetoric, 1988 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY 595, 605 (1988). 
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that new Congress or new Presidential appointees to key administrative 
agencies act to minimize or repeal that future-assessed tax, the taxpayer can 
then “exercise” the option to realize the gain under that new law. 
To be clear, the path of legal change does not need to be monotonically 
in favor of the taxpayer for this to work. It could be that one Congress passes 
a future-assessment reform, and the next Congress makes it even stronger. 
But if the Congress after that weakens or repeals the reform, the option is still 
valuable. Just as an asset price might be volatile, so can tax policy. Indeed 
the value of a financial option tends to increase with volatility in the price of 
the underlying asset.158 All the taxpayer needs to do is wait for a favorable 
moment to realize a gain159—and, as we discuss, history shows that taxpayers 
tend to do exactly that. 
Indeed, the option value that results from future-assessment tax reforms 
is even easier to exercise than are financial options, because taxpayers are 
typically given advance notice of upcoming political and legal changes as 
such changes work their way through the legislative or administrative 
process. Whereas the prices in financial markets are typically forward 
looking, taxpayers can often act to recognize their deferred tax liabilities in 
advance of upcoming tax hikes or strengthening of tax-base rules. 
By contrast to current-assessment reforms, later changes to a future-
assessment regime are inherently retroactive with respect to deferred tax 
liabilities. This is because, under a future-assessment regime, any economic 
income or accruals to wealth will be “inchoate” until the time of 
realization.160 Thus, even if the tax when realized carries with it an interest 
charge to cover the time-value benefits of deferral, any gain will, for purposes 
of tax law doctrine, still only be income in the year of realization.161 
Consequently, if a future Congress lowers the tax rate or the interest rate that 
applies to that gain, this would implicitly have retroactive effects even though 
it would doctrinally only apply to that year’s and future years’ realized 
 
158 See, e.g., Fischer Black, and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. POL ECON. 637, 644–45 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational 
Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGM’T SCI. 141, 148 (1973). 
159 To extend the metaphor, political optionality is like an “American” option, i.e., one 
that can be exercised at any time, rather than a “European” option, i.e., one that can be 
exercised only on its expiration date. See Black & Scholes, supra, at 637. 
160 The concept of “inchoate income” is generally considered incoherent from the 
perspective of “economic income.” See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 49, at 87. Nonetheless, the 
realization doctrine still means that economic income does not become “real” for tax 
purposes until the tax law says so.  
161 See, e.g., Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929); Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should 
Asset Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 IND. 
L.J. 77 (2011) (discussing the history of the realization doctrine). 
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income.162  
Exacerbating all of these dynamics, ultra-wealthy taxpayers can and do 
lobby and exert other political pressures to increase the likelihood of future 
legal or political changes being favorable to them, so as to increase the option 
value they derive from the realization doctrine and from future-assessment 
reforms. In this manner, the time value of options interacts with and 
magnifies the other ways in which future-assessment reforms foster dynamics 
that tend to result in these reforms eroding over time.   
 
3. Federal Budget Rules and Political Incentives  
 
Fiscal institutions and budget accounting rules, though somewhat 
technical and arcane, have very real effects on the politics of tax law and tax 
reform. In particular, they can weaken future-assessment reforms in some 
surprising ways. 
To see this requires first explaining a few basics of budget policy and 
revenue scoring. First, the Congressional Budget Office is required to 
“score”—i.e., providing a cost estimate of—bills and resolutions approved 
by Congressional committees.163 This is done using a combination of the 
CBO’s own methodology and the revenue estimates of tax bills produced by 
the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.164 That “score” is useful to 
legislators thinking about the overall budget, but also affects the enforcement 
of various budget rules and targets.165 
Second, one aspect of those budget rules is that revenue and cost 
estimates generally only cover the “budget window” of, typically, the next 
ten years.166 Revenue and cost effects beyond those years don’t appear in 
budget estimates and are only relevant in a few circumstances. 
Third, an important case when budget estimates outside the budget 
window are important is in the context of “budget reconciliation,” a process 
that allows budget-related bills to pass through expedited Congressional 
procedures (including denial of the Senate filibuster), provided however that 
 
162 This is even more true—obviously so—for some reforms of loophole benefits, like 
the step-up in basis. If the step-up in basis is repealed one year and reinstated the next, the 
repeal would have had no effect on anyone who had not died in the interim period.  
163 Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 202, 88 Stat. 297, 304 (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 
602(c)(2) (2018)). 
164 See Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Cost Estimates Explained 1-2 (Feb. 2020), 
available at: https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-02/56166-CBO-cost-estimates.pdf.  
165 Id. at 2.  
166 Under law, a Congressional budget resolution must cover a window of the next five 
year, 2 U.S.C. § 632, but typical practice has been to estimate revenue and outlays over a ten 
year period, see, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Data, 10-Year 
Budget Projections, https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data.  
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the do not raise the budget deficit in any of the “out years” beyond the budget 
window.167 This is one reason, for example, why recent tax cuts have been 
written to only stay in effect for the ten years after passage—to avoid 
increasing the deficit in years eleven and beyond.168 
What does this mean for future-assessment reform? Suppose Congress 
passes a law that includes retrospective capital gains taxation for at least some 
assets, like shares in closely held corporations or interests in partnerships. 
Because that revenue would appear only in some future years, it would have 
a muted revenue estimate for budget scoring purposes—some of the revenue 
would likely show up only in the “out” years, and thus would not be part of 
the official revenue estimate. Recall that we are talking still about current 
economic income—the actual taxation of gain that occurs in year 1 might not 
happen until year 11, and therefore it would essentially have no budget effect, 
even if the ultimate tax would be the present-value equivalent of taxing in 
year 1. And given budget rules, like various caps and pay-as-you-go rules, it 
would be institutionally difficult to spend that money before it is actually 
collected.169  
If government accounting were more rational, that future tax revenue 
might at least show up as a deferred tax asset on the government’s balance 
sheet—as value that it would monetize in the future.170 If that were the case, 
there might be a cost scored to future changes that destroyed the value of that 
asset. Alas, that is not the case.171 Instead, and perversely, Congress could 
pass a law that would lower the value of the tax asset—that is, would lower 
the total revenue likely to be collected over time—but would be scored as 
raising revenue (or at least lowering revenue less than it really does).172  
 
167 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 § 201(b), Pub. L. No. 
99–177, 99 Stat. 1037, 1053 (codified as 2 U.S.C. § 641 (2018)); Ellen P. Aprill and Daniel 
J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process; a Byrd’s Eye View, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 
103–04 (2018). 
168 E.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.). 
169 The federal government could of course borrow against that future revenue—the 
government has essentially unlimited borrowing capacity. But the associated spending would 
still show up as outlay without any offsetting revenue within the budget window. 
170 See, e.g., U.S. GAAP ASC 740.  
171 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FIN. REP. OF THE U.S. GOV’T 69 (2019), 
available at: https://fiscal.treasury.gov/files/reports-statements/financial-report/2019/FR-
02272020(Final).pdf.  
172 See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 4520, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004” 
(JCX-69-04) 5, line 22 (showing that a one-time 85% deduction for dividends received by a 
U.S. parent from a controlled foreign corporation would raise $2.8 billion for the year it was 
in effect, partially offsetting the projected revenue loss of $6 billion over the next nine years).  
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For example, suppose Congress repealed a future-assessment tax that 
would have taxed gain at the present-value equivalent of a current-assessment 
tax, and replaced it with a current-assessment tax, but at a far lower tax rate. 
For budget purposes, Congress would have lost a lot of revenue in the out 
years—the years beyond the ten-year budget window—but added a little 
revenue within the budget window. The bill would be a net loser in present 
value, but could increase revenue estimates for budget scoring purposes. This 
is a dynamic we saw played out, for example, in the taxation of the foreign 
income of U.S. multinational corporations, discussed below.173 
The reform need not be this dramatic for the same effect to exist. For 
example, Congress could keep the future-assessment tax in place but simply 
lower the tax rate or narrow the base that would apply upon realization. In a 
static setting, that would seem to lower revenue uniformly. But in a dynamic 
setting, the lower rate might induce some taxpayers to accelerate realization 
of their previously deferred tax liabilities inside the budget window, so as to 
take advantage of those reduced rates or narrowed base, again making it 
appear as if an overall revenue loser actually increases revenue.174 
The effect of these deferred tax assets (to the government) or liabilities 
(to taxpayers) goes beyond formal budget rules. The politics should be 
obvious—a tax cut that does not impact the budget for favored priorities is a 
win-win for most politicians. Moreover, as taxpayer deferred tax liabilities 
accumulate, enforcement incentives change. In particular, taxpayers would 
inevitably come up with new tax gaming ideas for making use of their 
deferred tax liabilities, and the larger the amount of accumulated deferred tax 
liabilities, the more pressure there would likely be on the Treasury and IRS 
to be lax in policing these new forms of tax gaming.175 
By contrast, a current-assessment reform would immediately begin 
generating tax revenue. Then, subsequently reducing the tax rates or 
narrowing the base would be expensive because instead of reducing the value 
of the government’s deferred tax assets (a non-budgetary cost) there would 
be a reduction in current tax revenue that would directly affect budget 
scoring. Moreover, if that change were to also reduce tax revenue in the out 
years, it could not be passed through the expedited budget reconciliation 
process. 
 
173 See infra Subsection III.C.2. 
174 This is the opposite of the problem with raising current capital gains tax rates (absent 
a current-assessment reform) as explained supra in notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
175 As Daniel Hemel has explained, political pressures tend to bias the Treasury 
Department and IRS toward using their regulatory authority mostly in taxpayer-favorable, 
revenue-losing directions, because doing so “will be quite attractive to the President: if his 
administration acts on its own to reduce taxes, the President will reap all the political benefits, 
while he and Congress will share the political costs of spending cuts.” Hemel, supra note 
152, at 643.  
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All of this adds up to asymmetric institutional pressures. A current-
assessment reform, once passed, becomes somewhat sticky—repealing it 
would cost real money, in budget terms, and face a more difficult legislative 
process with more stringent budget rules. By contrast, a future-assessment 
reform carries the seeds of its own diminution, since scaling it back or 
repealing it would appear to cost less in budget terms than it really does and 
could even score as increasing revenue. These asymmetric pressures magnify 
the political optionality benefits to taxpayers from future-assessment reforms, 
by making it substantially more likely that law or policy will move in the 
direction of reducing the future taxation of deferred tax liabilities. 
Further exacerbating these asymmetric institutional pressures are the 
indirect effects related to the political incentives of building coalitions around 
the spending of tax revenues. This is because tax revenue generated today—
such as through a current-assessment reform—can be used to fund public 
spending or other policy goals, which would likely then generate a political 
constituency with the motivation to defend this new revenue source.  
We discussed above the typical dynamic of concentrated costs and diffuse 
benefits that characterizes repealing tax benefits for the ultra-wealthy.176 One 
way to counteract that, at least partially, would be to use the new revenue 
stream to create a constituency that would lose something if the new revenue 
source were lost. Yet a future-assessment reform, by contrast, would in most 
circumstances not be able to appropriate the tax revenues it might eventually 
raise until some theoretical future date. Of course, Congress could choose to 
borrow in advance of receiving that revenue. Indeed, that might be the 
financially rational thing to do, if the future revenue were assured. But, as 
noted above, budget accounting and budget politics do not generally provide 
for a clean way to do that. Thus, without a constituency directly benefitting 
from the future-assessment revenue stream, repeal would have diminished 
political cost—just as it would also have diminished budget cost. 
B. Prior Future-Assessment Proposals 
We believe there is a strong theoretical case for current-assessment 
reforms, compared to future-assessment reforms, as discussed in the prior 
subsection. However, the prior literature has generally concluded that more 
conventional (realization-based) future-assessment reforms should suffice 
for fixing the personal tax system, so that current-assessment reforms have 
typically been viewed as unnecessary and thus not worth pursuing.177 To flesh 
out our theoretical argument, we now examine two prominent categories of 
future-assessment reforms in more detail: (1) retrospective capital gains tax 
 
176 See supra notes 147–152 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra note 18. 
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reforms (including hybrids of partial mark-to-market and retrospective 
capital gains tax reforms), and (2) progressive consumption tax reforms.  
We focus here in particular on reforms that address the time-value 
benefits of deferral, since these are the trickiest problems to solve. By 
contrast, there are numerous proposals for ending at least some of the major 
loophole benefits of deferral (the other category of existing-law benefits of 
deferral).178 For example, repeal of the section 1014 step-up in basis would 
be relatively straightforward—at least in terms of legislative drafting. The 
primary obstacles instead are the political difficulty of accomplishing it, and 
then sustaining it. As we will explain below, the history of prior attempts to 
repeal the basis step-up illustrate the dangers of political optionality. And we 
believe those same dangers also arise with these more comprehensive future-
assessment reform proposals that we will discuss below. 
The reform proposals below would—if they remained politically stable—
end (or, at least make irrelevant) the time-value benefits of deferral. However, 
as we will elaborate, these proposals would retain the political optionality 
benefit of deferral. That is, because these proposals would continue to use 
realization as the time of tax assessment, the actual collection of tax would 
often occur in later time periods than when income is earned (or when wealth 
or spending power is accumulated). As a result, these proposals would be 
vulnerable to later political or legal changes undermining the actual collection 
of tax. 
 
1. Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation 
 
A realization-based tax system can, at least in theory, counteract the time-
value benefits of deferral by instituting an additional charge at the time of 
realization that reflects the time value of money during the deferral period—
essentially an interest charge that covers the time from when the income was 
earned to when it is taxed. The seminal modern proposal of this type came 
from Alan Auerbach.179 Auerbach’s proposal has since been praised and 
elaborated by many other academics and analysts.180 
Auerbach’s proposal is actually more nuanced than simply an interest 
charge. Prior retrospective proposals, especially that of William Vickrey in 
1939, imagined knowing how much unrealized gain was earned in a given 
 
178 See id. 
179 See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 167 
(1991). See also Alan J. Auerbach & David F. Bradford, Generalized Cash-Flow Taxation, 
88 J. Pub. Econ. 35 (2004).  
180 E.g., Kwak, supra note 18, 191; Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal 
for Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 45 (1996); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization 
Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency, and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial 
Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 73 (1994).  
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year, and thus how much tax would have been owed on realization.181 The 
government could then just treat that unpaid tax as a loan and charge interest 
accordingly, repeating each year. The catch, as Auerbach points out, is that 
this would require knowing the value of the asset at each point in time, which 
we often do not.182 
Auerbach suggested a different approach. He was primarily concerned 
with the lock-in effect—the incentive that taxpayers have, at any given 
moment in time, to hold an asset, thus deferring tax, rather than sell it and be 
taxed.183 The goal of Auerbach’s proposal was “holding-period neutrality,” 
i.e., a world where, at any given point in a time, taxpayers would be 
indifferent between holding or selling assets.184 If the lock-in effect could be 
removed, that would eliminate some of the welfare costs of the realization 
doctrine. Auerbach demonstrated how to achieve holding-period neutrality 
with a formula that uses only the asset value at realization, the tax rate, the 
holding period, and the risk-free interest rate, and without needing to know 
asset values during the holding period. This formula computes a tax upon 
realization that increases the longer the holding period.185 
Auerbach’s proposal was designed to avoid the liquidity and valuation 
problems that the prior literature has generally viewed as being the primary 
disadvantages of current-assessment reforms.186 As Auerbach has noted, 
however, retrospective capital gains taxation alone is not sufficient to end the 
existing-law benefits of deferral without other reforms, most importantly 
repealing the step-up in basis at death.187 This is because retrospective capital 
gains taxation cannot solve the problem of a legal rule that simply erases a 
large portion of the tax base.  
 
181 William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. ECON. 
379 (1939). 
182 Indeed, in the current era, retrospective proposals are almost uniformly directed at 
illiquid assets, where annual accrual taxation would be too inaccurate. If the value is known, 
as with publicly traded assets, we can instead use mark-to-market schemes. 
183 Auerbach, supra note 179, at 167. 
184 Id. at 169.  
185 Id. at 170. In the simple case where there are no cash flows from the asset, just an 
increase in value, Auerbach’s formula for a tax liability at time s is 𝑇" = (1 − 𝑒#$%&)𝐴&, 
where t is the tax rate, i is the risk-free interest rate, and As is the value of the asset at time s. 
Conceptually, the tax system taxes the investor as if the asset had grown at the risk-free rate 
to reach the value of As. The idea is that at any given point in time, a rational investor should 
be indifferent at the margin before taxes between investing in a risky and a risk-free asset, 
which implies a risk-adjusted expected rate of return for the risky asset equal to the risk-free 
rate. If that is so, then telling the investor that they will pay tax in the future on that risk-free 
return regardless of whether they sell or hold should make them indifferent after taxes too.  
186 Auerbach, supra note 179, at 168.  
187 See Alan Auerbach, Reforming Capital Gains Taxation, 135 TAX NOTES 1399, 1399 
(2012). 
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But that limitation points at the larger problems caused by the political-
optionality benefits of deferral. By leaving intact the taxpayer’s choice as to 
when the tax will apply (even if the amount of the tax is calculated so as to 
theoretically be timing neutral), retrospective capital gains tax reforms would 
allow taxpayers the option to wait for future legal changes beneficial to 
them.188  
The problems that the political optionality benefits of deferral pose for 
full retrospective capital gains tax proposals also apply to hybrids of partial 
mark-to-market and retrospective capital gains tax proposals. Most of the 
proposals in the prior literature for mark-to-market style reforms would 
actually only enact a partial mark-to-market system that would apply mostly 
just to publicly traded securities.189 With respect to other, harder to value 
assets, many of these proposals would then apply a retrospective capital gains 
tax reform. 
However, taking account of the political optionality benefits of deferral, 
sophisticated taxpayers would almost certainly expect that future legal or 
political changes would eventually undermine the retrospective capital gains 
tax component of such a reform, so that sophisticated taxpayers would likely 
still face large incentives to shift their investments away from assets subject 
to the mark-to-market component of the reform toward those subject to 
retrospective capital gains component. For this reason, although a hybrid of 
a partial mark-to-market and a retrospective capital gains tax reform might 
perhaps be better than nothing, we doubt that such a reform could succeed at 
fixing how the income tax is currently broken. 
 
2. Progressive Consumption Taxation 
 
An alternative realization-based approach for eliminating the time-value 
benefits of deferral involves abandoning the attempt to tax time-value returns 
altogether. Various approaches for progressive consumption tax reform 
proposals have been designed to accomplish this, with specific versions of 
these proposals often labeled as personal expenditure tax reforms, 
progressive spending tax reforms, and cash flow consumption tax reforms, 
 
188 Auerbach’s version of retrospective capital gains taxation has other problems as well. 
A large one is that it taxes from an ex ante perspective rather than ex post, meaning that those 
who ended up with especially large extra-normal returns would end up being taxed relatively 
lightly as a percentage of their actual gains. See Auerbach, supra note 179, at 176–77. This 
is especially concerning if our motivation is to more effectively tax the ultra-wealthy—by 
definition, the big ex-post winners.  
189 See Kleinbard, supra note 27, at 354 (“Nearly every such proposal limits its reach to 
publicly traded instruments ….”); supra note 136 (discussing Senator Wyden’s proposal of 
this sort). 
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among other labels.190  
Although specific design elements vary, these different consumption tax 
proposals generally share two key features: first, including in the tax base 
only funds used for consumption, at the time that these funds are used for 
consumption; and second, eliminating the tax on the risk-free time-value 
returns to holding wealth.191 By taxing funds only once when withdrawn to 
fund consumption, the ultimate tax is the same in present-value terms no 
matter when the funds are withdrawn, thereby eliminating any financial time-
value benefits to deferral.  
Furthermore, well-designed consumption tax reform proposals would 
generally also change the tax rules governing borrowing, so that borrowing 
money to fund consumption would generate the same tax as would selling 
assets to fund consumption.192 Thus, taxpayers like Larry Ellison (who, as we 
previously explained,193 has funded around $10 billion of untaxed 
consumption through borrowing) should face much higher effective tax rates 
under a well-designed progressive consumption tax than under the existing 
income tax. 
However, as with retrospective capital gains taxation, progressive 
consumption tax reforms would retain the realization-based nature of the 
personal tax system, by allowing for separation in time between the point at 
which the power to spend is accumulated and when it is taxed.194 This thus 
retains the political-optionality benefits of deferral.  
 
190 E.g., Victor Thuronyi, A Supplemental Expenditure Tax for Canada,  67 CANADIAN 
TAX J. 711, 711 (2019) (“cash flow consumption tax”); Edward J. McCaffery & James R. 
Hines, The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 SOUTHERN CALIF. L. REV. 1031, 1031 
(2010) (“progressive spending tax”); Alan D. Viard, Fundamental Tax Reform: A 
Comparison Of Three Options (November 5, 2015) (“personal expenditure tax”) (working 
paper, on filed with authors).  
191 Under most versions of these sorts of reform proposals, supernormal returns (or 
“economic rents”) would still be included in the tax base. Many commentators also argue 
that “risky returns” do not face an effective tax burden under an income tax and therefore 
can be ignored, though this is not a universal view. See John R. Brooks, Taxation, Risk, and 
Portfolio Choice: The Treatment of Returns to Risk Under a Normative Income Tax, 66 TAX 
L. REV. 255 (2013).  
192 This is often held out as a major advantage of progressive consumption taxation over 
income taxation—one could not pursue the usual buy-borrow-die strategy. See, e.g., 
McCaffery, supra note 10, at 878–80.  
193 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
194 By delaying when money received is used to fund consumption, a taxpayer can create 
a separation in time between when money is received by the taxpayer and when that money 
is realized and reported as taxable under a consumption tax. This is still deferral and allows 
the taxpayer to defer tax while waiting for favorable (to the taxpayer) future legal changes. 
Whether we call this receipt of money “income” or “wealth accumulation” or something else, 
the key is that taxpayers can receive money along with control of that money, and then defer 
any tax on those receipts by delaying consumption. 
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It may perhaps seem odd to describe a tax on current consumption as 
being a future-assessment reform. But because consumption generally occurs 
at a point after income has been earned, and thus also after the power to spend 
has been accumulated, a consumption tax is assessed in the future with 
respect to both income and the accumulation of spending power. We can thus 
analytically distinguish the base that is to be taxed over a taxpayer’s lifetime 
(here, total lifetime consumption) from the points in time at which that tax is 
to be assessed and collected. The typical consumption tax proposal uses the 
times when actual consumption occurs to impose tax, but we could imagine 
a current-assessment version of a progressive consumption tax that instead 
imposes tax at the times in which spending power accumulates. 
Thus, to transform any of the major progressive consumption tax reform 
proposals into a current-assessment reform, all that is needed is to add a pre-
payment or withholding mechanism that would assess and collect tax as the 
power to spend accumulates. These pre-paid or withheld (currently-assessed) 
tax payments could then be reconciled with the final assessment of tax that 
could be calculated when funds are withdrawn to pay for actual 
consumption.195  
Because the progressive consumption tax proposals in the prior literature 
lack such mechanisms, we label them future-assessment reforms. Thus, under 
any of these proposals, a taxpayer could just wait for a tax rate reduction or a 
narrowing of the tax base before withdrawing funds for consumption and 
thereby subjecting those funds to tax. Because taxpayers could opt to 
postpone withdrawing funds for consumption until a later period, they could 
simply wait for a more favorable Congress or IRS. To be sure, many 
taxpayers have much less ability to defer actual consumption than they do to 
just defer realization under the rules of the existing income tax. Thus, 
strategic deferral might be somewhat less available as a tax planning strategy 
under a well-designed progressive consumption tax than under either the 
existing income tax or a retrospective capital gains tax. Indeed, this is part of 
the normative arguments typically made in favor of using consumption as a 
tax base.196   
However, the ultra-wealthy differ from more ordinary taxpayers and—
almost by definition—have more wealth than they are likely to ever consume. 
Many of the ultra-wealthy would thus be able to strategically time at least 
large portions of their withdrawals following any of these progressive 
 
195 We plan to elaborate on how proposals of this sort could work in future scholarship. 
Daniel Hemel has previously explained how a pre-payment or withholding mechanism of 
this sort could work in the context of a retrospective capital gains tax reform. Hemel, supra 
note 30, at 768–69.  
196 See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN 
PUBLIC ECONOMY 161 (1959) (on arguments for the proper “index of equality”). 
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consumption tax reforms. In particular, future heirs would have a strong 
incentive to lobby hard for future rate changes or exemptions, knowing that 
most of their consumption would come in later time periods. 
Thus, the likelihood that future consumption would eventually come to 
be taxed at a lower effective rates, due to political or legal changes, would 
almost certainly lead many ultra-wealthy taxpayers to defer substantial 
portions of their tax liabilities. This would then result in essentially the same 
dynamics as with retrospective capital gains tax reforms,197 although perhaps 
to a comparatively lesser degree.198   
C. Historical Examples of Political Optionality in Action 
To further explain why we are skeptical of future-assessment reforms that 
would leave intact the political optionality benefits of deferral, we next 
discuss lessons that can be drawn from tax history. Specifically, we consider 
three sets of historical examples where political optionality undermined 
important aspects of the tax system: a) capital gains tax rate fluctuations, b) 
tax holidays related to the repatriation of foreign-source income, and c) 
stepped-up basis reform efforts.  
Each of these historical examples illustrates a slightly different aspect of 
the problems posed by the political optionality benefits of deferral, and 
together they tell a strong cautionary tale against any reform that would act 
to limit only the existing-law benefits of deferral without also limiting the 
political optionality benefits of deferral. Specifically, the history of taxpayer 
 
197 Edward Kleinbard has made a limited version of this argument in a few paragraphs 
of his prior work (Kleinbard, Right Tax, supra note 27, at 232–33). In particular, Kleinbard 
focuses on the concern that, following the enactment of a progressive consumption tax 
reform, Congress would see large amounts of invested wealth build up and not spent/realized, 
and so would then be unable to resist the temptation to create tax holidays, especially during 
economic downturns. We agree with Kleinbard on this point, but we view this as only a 
portion of the broader problems that the political optionality benefits of deferral pose for 
progressive consumption tax reforms. As we explained in subsection III.A.1, inertia and drift 
are the dominant feature of tax politics, and it is thus much easier for a coalition to defeat 
attempts to modify previously enacted tax reforms than to create new modifications. 
Consequently, what is likely to be the most important dimension of the problems that the 
political optionality benefits of deferral pose for progressive consumption tax reforms arises 
from the near inevitability of taxpayers eventually devising tax-gaming stratagems capable 
of granting them access to their deferred tax liabilities without triggering tax, followed by a 
failure to adequately police these stratagems. For some examples of how this could happen, 
see Gamage, supra note 65, at 428–29.  
198 Whether a progressive consumption tax reform would result in these sort of dynamics 
to a comparatively lesser, or a comparatively greater, degree is hard to say, and would depend 
on the design of the progressive consumption tax reform, among other factors. Notably, 
many of the most prominent proposals for progressive consumption tax reforms would 
involve full expensing, which would result in much greater deferral of tax liabilities as 
compared to either the existing income tax or a retrospective capital gains tax.  
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responses to capital gains tax rate fluctuations reveals the extent to which 
taxpayers can be expected to change their behavior in response to future legal 
changes and even just the possibility of such changes. The history of the 
repatriation of the foreign-source income of controlled foreign corporations 
then clarifies how the political optionality benefits of deferral on their own 
(even in the absence of any existing-law benefits of deferral) can create 
powerful incentives for taxpayers to defer realizing income. And, finally, the 
history of attempts at reforming the provision for stepped-up basis shows the 
unsustainability of attempting to end the major loophole benefits of deferral 
absent current-assessment reforms, and, more generally, how reform attempts 
that would rely on future assessment can be highly vulnerable to political 
attack.  
 
1. Capital Gains Tax Rate Fluctuations 
 
Legislators regularly tinker with tax rates, whether to achieve revenue 
targets, distributional goals, constituent demands, economic incentives, or 
other goals. This includes not just tax rates on capital gains, but also ordinary 
income, corporate income, and more. Indeed, rates on ordinary and corporate 
income have varied over a wider range than capital gains. Since 1981, the top 
statutory marginal rate on ordinary income has varied between 28% and 50%, 
and the top corporate rate has varied between 46% and 21%. In that same 
period, the top capital gains rate has fluctuated between 15% and 29%.199 
Nevertheless, due to the realization doctrine, we should expect capital 
gains rate changes to influence behavior far more than changes to ordinary 
income or corporate income. This is because it is relatively easy to shift the 
timing of capital gains realization forward or backward to maximize tax 
benefits, but harder to do so for most business and salary income. And, 
indeed, past experience with rate changes have shown that there is a relatively 
high elasticity (that is, taxpayer responsiveness) of capital gains realizations 
to the tax rate, particularly from transitory rate changes.200 In other words, 
taxpayers—and especially sophisticated taxpayers—clearly do plan their 
capital gains realizations strategically in the face of rate changes.201 
For example, in 1987 the capital gains rate went up from 20% to 28%, 
 
199 After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, there was even a 33% “bubble rate” that applied 
to taxpayers just below the highest income group, intended to offset the advantages of the 
lower marginal rates on smaller income amounts. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
55-914, § 302(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). This was intended to achieve the effect of a flat 
28% for the higher income groups, and so we treat 28% as the top rate for that period. 
200 E.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Capital Gains in the United States: Realizations, Revenue, 
and Rhetoric, 2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 595, 595 (1988).  
201 Alan J. Auerbach & Jonathan M. Siegel, Capital-Gains Realizations of the Rich and 
Sophisticated, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 276 (2000). 
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and as a result, capital gains realizations spiked in 1986, the year before the 
increase, and then dropped to an even lower level during the 1987–1997 
period.202 We saw similar behavior in 2012, the year before the 15% capital 
gains rate increased to 20%.203 Same for 2017, as taxpayers assumed that rate 
cuts or other tax breaks would be coming in that year’s tax reform bill.204 
Sophisticated taxpayers—who hold most of the capital gain–producing 
assets205—have repeatedly shown that they will time realizations based on 
anticipated tax changes. 
The regular fluctuation of capital gains tax rates also reveals a different—
but related—type of behavior. David Kamin and Jason Oh apply a similar 
analysis as we do here to argue that capital gains rate uncertainty itself 
generates a return to deferral, because of the option value of a potential future 
lower rate.206 They argue, for example, that if the current capital gains rate is 
relatively high, then a taxpayer might reasonably guess that in a future year, 
the rate could revert toward the historical mean, thus creating an incentive to 
defer realization until that future year. When the taxpayer has a long time 
horizon, the likelihood of some future year having a lower rate increases, thus 
also increasing the incentive to wait.207 How much this behavior occurs in 
practice is an empirical question that requires further study, but the logic is 
compelling and dovetails with other common tax planning strategies, such as 
deferring compensation until future, lower tax-bracket years.208 
 
2. Repatriation Holidays 
 
A similar option value to waiting is at play in the choices of multinational 
corporations for when to “repatriate” the income earned by their foreign 
subsidiaries back to the U.S. parent corporation. Because even related 
corporations are treated as separate legal entities, the income earned by a 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) does not become U.S. source income 
of the parent corporation until the subsidiary actually pays a dividend to the 
 
202 Timothy Dowd & Robert McClelland, The Bunching of Capital Gains Realizations, 
Tax Policy Center Report (Feb. 7, 2017) (citing Treasury Department data). 
203 Id. 
204 See, e.g., Max Ehrenfreund & Damian Paletta, Americans Are Taking Their Sweet 
Time Paying Taxes, and the Government is Running out of Cash, WASH. POST, June 1, 2017. 
205 See supra Section I.A. 
206 Kamin & Oh, supra note 30. 
207 Kamin and Oh also introduce the step-up in basis into their model. If a person if close 
to death, there is much less uncertainty about the future capital gains rate, since it will be 0% 
shortly. That decreases the uncertainty, but increase even more the incentive to wait, as we 
discuss below. If anticipated death is farther away, a taxpayer might decide to take advantage 
of a low-rate year in the interim. Id. at 19–20. 
208 This is the primary reason a person would choose a traditional 401(k) or IRA plan 
over a “Roth”-style 401(k) or IRA plan, for example. 
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parent.209 Prior to 2018, that decision carried heavy tax consequences, 
analogous to the realization doctrine for capital gains—by simply not having 
the CFC distribute a dividend to the U.S. parent, the U.S. parent could avoid 
paying current U.S. tax. 
As with the capital gain income of U.S. individuals, the timing of a 
repatriation dividend was almost entirely voluntary. There is little non-tax 
cost from failing to repatriate—if the parent corporation needs capital, for 
example, the fact that it had off-shore cash holdings makes it easier to raise 
money in the capital markets. And in the case of public companies, 
shareholders need not wait for a dividend to get access to the profits, since 
they could just sell shares on the market instead (or borrow against the shares, 
as described above). 
But the repatriation case also departs from the individual capital gains 
case in an important way. In the case of individual capital gains, deferral also 
generates a time-value financial benefit. As we’ve discussed, that existing-
law benefit is on top of the political-optionality benefits of also waiting for a 
favorable legal change. With repatriation, however, the time-value benefits 
of deferral were often not present—all that was available to multinational 
corporations in many circumstances were the political-optionality benefits. 
Yet this was still more than enough to dramatically affect their behavior. 
Tax scholars have shown that, if a business enterprise faces a similar 
corporate tax rate and access to investment in the foreign jurisdiction as in 
the U.S., then there really is not a time-value financial benefit of deferring 
repatriation.210 This is because the cash in question would be earning a similar 
return while being held by the CFC, and that return would be taxed at a 
similar rate in the interim. Moreover, when the dividend was finally paid, it 
would be larger (by the after–foreign tax rate of return), and thus so also 
would be the tax collected on that dividend. It can be shown with simple math 
that this is equivalent to repatriating the dividend earlier, and then investing 
that cash in the U.S.211 The only factors that matter are the rates of return and 
the tax rates in the two jurisdictions, not the timing of the dividend. 
For sure, multinationals have been quite aggressive about lowering their 
effective foreign tax rates, through international structuring or simply 
housing the CFC in a low- or no-tax jurisdiction. But the evidence shows that 
multinationals were also keeping cash offshore even in high-tax 
jurisdictions.212 Why was that, if in fact there were no time-value financial 
 
209 See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 31–32 
(2014). 
210 Id. at 82–84. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 85–87. 
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benefits from doing so?213 
The answer, of course, comes from the political optionality benefits of 
deferral. In 2004, when U.S. corporations had perhaps $500 billion of cash 
held in offshore subsidiaries,214 Congress enacted a repatriation “holiday,” a 
low 5.25% tax rate on dividends paid by CFCs during 2005 and 2006 (as 
opposed to the then-existing 35% tax rate on corporate income).215 
Congress’s theory was presumably that a one-time holiday would allow the 
offshore cash to come home and be reinvested in the United States216 
(notwithstanding the fact that much of that cash was already in dollar-
denominated accounts at U.S. banks, and often invested in U.S. 
Treasuries).217 And if corporations were told it was a one-time holiday, they 
would change their behavior going forward and not keep hoarding cash 
offshore. 
The foreseeable result, however, was that U.S. corporations instead 
became even more emboldened to aggressively hoard cash offshore after 
2006 and to then start lobbying for yet another repatriation holiday. In effect, 
Congress had signaled that a future lower rate was politically possible, 
meaning that the probability-weighted expected future tax rate immediately 
decreased. By thereby increasing the political optionality benefit of deferral, 
Congress increased the likelihood that corporations would continue to delay 
repatriation. And indeed, even though around $360 billion was repatriated 
under this provision,218 offshore cash holdings quickly shot back up, 
exceeding $2 trillion by 2017.219  
 
213 Another possible explanation is that there was an accounting benefit to keeping 
money offshore if the corporation could claim that the money was “permanently reinvested 
income.” In that case, there would not be current tax charge for the deferred income, thus 
giving a boost to reported earnings. Id. at 86. 
214 See Glenn R. Simpson and Gregory Zuckerman, Tax Windfall May Not Boost Hiring 
Despite Claims, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2004, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109763358839943873.  
215 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 §422(a), Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418, 
1514–19. The new section 965 providing for an 85% dividends received deduction, meaning 
that only 15% of repatriated dividends were subject to the then-current corporate tax rate of 
35%. That is equivalent to a 5.25% tax rate on 100% of the dividend.  
216 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 108-548(I), at 146. 
217 See U.S. Sen. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Offshore Funds Located 
Onshore, Majority Staff Report Addendum (Dec. 14, 2011), available at: 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Repatriation%20Report%20ADDENDUM%
20(FINAL).pdf.  
218 Melissa Redmiles, The One-Time Received Dividend Deduction, IRS Stat. of Inc. 
Bull. 103 (Spring 2018), available at: https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/08codivdeductbul.pdf.  
219 See Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, Fortune 500 Companies Hold a 
Record $2.6 Trillion Offshore (March 2017), available at: https://itep.org/fortune-500-
companies-hold-a-record-26-trillion-offshore.  
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The corporations’ bet on the political optionality benefits of deferral 
ultimately paid off. Congress came close to passing another repatriation 
holiday in 2009,220 but then in 2017 enacted a holiday as a part of the general 
shift to a modified territorial regime.221 The huge influx of cash to U.S. parent 
corporations that followed was the likely cause of the burst of share 
repurchases during 2018.222 
Because of the shift to a modified territorial regime—that is, one in which 
foreign-source income, such as the profits of a controlled foreign corporation, 
are taxed only in the source jurisdiction—we may not see this pattern 
repeated in the future, at least to the same degree. But we nevertheless look 
to this example to highlight that the political optionality benefits of deferral 
are real and can dramatically affect taxpayer behavior in predictable ways. If 
a person or corporation can easily choose when to realize income, and if there 
is even a chance that the effective tax rate on that income will be lower in the 
future than today, the strategic choice is obvious and easy to implement. 
Moreover, when the taxpayer’s own behavior can affect the likelihood of a 
future lower rate coming about—through lobbying or other political 
activity—it becomes even more clear what the taxpayer will likely do.  
 
3. Stepped-Up Basis Reform Efforts 
 
As we have noted repeatedly, Section 1014’s provision for stepped-up 
basis upon death is perhaps the most important of the loophole benefits of 
deferral under existing law. Because of that provision, if an individual or 
family taxpayer can avoid realizing gains during their lifetimes, the gain will 
be wiped out at death when the asset is passed to the taxpayer’s heirs.  
The problematic nature of Section 1014 is well known, and few defend it 
on a normative basis. Stanley Surrey, for example, called it  
“the most serious defect in the federal tax structure” 50 years ago.223 And, in 
theory, the solution is simple: just replace the basis step-up with a carryover 
basis regime, as already exists for gifts made during a donor’s life,224 or, 
alternatively, treat death as a realization event for the decedent. Such reforms 
have been proposed numerous times over the years, and have even been 
 
220 See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard and Martin A. Sullivan, News Analysis: Repatriation Aid 
for the Financial Crisis?, 53 TAX NOTES INT’L 275 (Jan. 26, 2009).  
221 See, e.g., Joint Comm. on Tax’n, Description of H.R. 1, The “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” 
(JCX-50-17) 249 (Nov. 3, 2017) (describing the shift to a “participation exemption system” 
in which dividends from CFC’s would be exempt from U.S. tax in most cases).  
222 See, e.g., Emily Stewart, Stock Buybacks, Explained, VOX (Aug. 5, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/2/17639762/stock-buybacks-tax-cuts-trump-republicans.  
223 Stanley Surrey & Jerome Kurtz, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury 
Proposals, the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1381 (1970). 
224 I.R.C. § 1015.  
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partially enacted—yet they never last.  
As Larry Zelenak and others have noted, under the original income tax in 
1918 all transfers by gift or bequest resulted in a step-up in basis, though this 
was because of Treasury guidance, not because of any statutory law.225 In the 
Revenue Act of 1921, Congress then created the current split treatment, with 
a carryover basis for inter vivos gifts but codifying the step-up at death.226 At 
that time, the primary argument for the step-up at death was to avoid double 
taxation when most applicable taxpayers were also subject to the estate tax. 
Because there was no federal gift tax at the time, the issue cut the other way 
for inter vivos gifts—a carryover basis rule allowed for income taxation of 
gifts, since they were not included in the estate tax.227  
So the particular reform put in place in 1921 had a logic to it at the time. 
But—as an illustration of the sort of policy drift that we discuss above—that 
logic became obsolete by at least by 1932, when the gift tax was added 
permanently,228 and certainly by 1944, when Congress made permanent the 
wartime expansion of the income tax,229 such that it went from covering 5% 
of households to 56% of households by 1946, and continuing to grow from 
there.230 Income taxpayers and estate taxpayers were no longer the same 
households, and gifts were no longer exempt from wealth-transfer taxes.  
In 1942, Treasury tried to get Congress to enact a carryover basis 
provision, and in 1963 and again in 1969 Treasury (with Surrey as Assistant 
Secretary for Tax Policy) pushed a detailed realization-at-death provision 
instead, but in the face of opposition these proposals each went nowhere.231 
In 1976, the first real change occurred, with a carryover basis provision 
(Section 1023) replacing Section 1014.232 The provision had a number of 
exceptions to carryover basis treatment, including for life insurance and 
annuity policies, and also provided a minimum basis of $60,000 (so still a 
pretty large step-up in 1976, even if not to full fair market value).233 The 
provision also provided a full exemption for up to $10,000 of property 
 
225 See Larry Zelenak, The Tax-Free Basis Step-Up at Death, the Charitable Deduction 
For Unrealized Appreciation, and the Persistence of Error, at 4-8, working paper on file 
with authors.  
226 Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(a)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 229. 
227 See Zelenak, supra note 225, at 13-14.  
228 Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245. There was also 
a gift tax in place from 1924 to 1926. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 319, 43 
Stat. 253, 313. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The List History of Estate and Gift 
Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875 (2010). 
229 Individual Income Tax Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-315, 58 Stat. 231. 
230 LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE PERSONAL EXEMPTIONS IN THE INCOME TAX 62 (1968).  
231 See Zelenak, supra note 225, at 40-42. 
232 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1520.  
233 Id. (proposed § 1023(b)(2) (definition of “carryover basis property”), (d) ($60,000 
minimum basis)). 
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transferred.234 Despite these carve-outs (or perhaps because of them), the 
provision was quickly deemed unworkable, and its effective date was 
postponed to 1980,235 and then ultimately repealed in 1980 with retroactive 
effect.236 Industry groups, professional organizations, and even the tax bar 
put strong pressure on Congress for repeal during that period.237 Ultimately, 
the complaints about complexity and workability won the day and preserved 
this large benefit for owners of wealth. 
Importantly for our theory and approach,238 the 1976 attempted reform 
reveals how the combination of incremental Congressional action and non-
action often tilts in favor of non-taxation of deferred tax liabilities. As a part 
of the compromise to enact the carryover basis provision, Congress also 
increased the estate tax exemption, from $60,000 to $154,000, under the 
reasonable argument that much of that property would instead come under 
the income tax umbrella due to the carryover basis provision. But when the 
carryover basis provision was repealed, the higher estate tax exemption was 
kept in place—the whole effort thus ended up being a net benefit to wealthy 
taxpayers. A current-assessment reform would likely have avoided that 
perverse result. 
The next (and only other) major attempt to repeal the step-up in basis 
came under the Bush tax cuts in 2001, which also provided for a slow phase-
out and then repeal of the estate tax.239 When the estate tax was fully repealed 
in 2010, a new partial carryover basis provision (Section 1022) was to take 
effect—partial, because each decedent was entitled to $1,300,000 of 
aggregate basis increase, which could be spread among the property in the 
estate.240 Recognizing the original connection between the estate tax and the 
step-up in basis provision, the general consensus at the time continued to be 
that the two should come and go together,241 and so the price of estate tax 
repeal was also repeal of the basis step-up and the institution of a carryover 
basis regime.  
Because the Bush tax cuts were passed using budget reconciliation, and 
 
234 Id. (proposed § 1023(b)(3)).  
235 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2763, 2884.  
236 Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299. 
237 See Zelenak, supra note 225, at 51; Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the 
Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAX L. REV. 411, 442-48 (1982). 
238 See supra Section III.A. 
239 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-16, § 
501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69. 
240 Id. (proposed § 1022(b)). 
241 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 23 (2005). Proponents of estate tax repeal seem 
today to have ridded themselves of the need to have a consistent approach to these policies. 
Major estate tax repeal proposals no longer included a repeal of Section 1014 and institution 
of carryover basis. See, e.g., Death Tax Repeal Act of 2019, S. 215, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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therefore under the “Byrd Rule” could not raise deficits in years outside the 
10-year budget window,242 the estate tax was scheduled to come back in full 
force in 2011, along with Section 1014. The hope of Congressional 
Republicans in 2001 was that a future Congress would make the estate tax 
repeal permanent,243 but that did not happen. As a result, Section 1022 would 
have only been in force for one year, 2010. Even that was too much, however, 
and the provisions were instead repealed.244 However, estates of those who 
died during 2010 could still elect to forgo both the estate tax and the step-up 
in basis—again illustrating the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose nature of post-
enactment changes.245  
The broader lesson here is that the income tax almost certainly cannot be 
sustainably fixed just by calling for an end to stepped-up basis and the other 
major loopholes that allow taxpayers to wipe out their deferred tax liabilities. 
Even if these reform attempts were to be enacted, why should we expect them 
to be sustained? Both theory and history strongly suggest the opposite—that 
even if the major loophole benefits were to be ended, absent an accompanying 
current-assessment reform, ultra-wealthy taxpayers would just continue to 
defer their tax liabilities while lobbying for the loopholes to be restored (or 
perhaps for new loopholes to come into effect), and these efforts by the ultra-




Parts I and II of this Article explained how the existing U.S. income tax 
is broken, especially with respect to the ultra-wealthy, and with many harmful 
consequences. Part III then argued that, because of the political optionality 
benefit of deferral, only current-assessment reforms are likely to succeed at 
repairing the income tax or otherwise fixing the personal tax system. 
Together, these Parts thus established the case for why a current-assessment 
reform is needed: the only way to effectively tax today’s income (or, 
alternatively, today’s accumulations of wealth or of spending power) is to tax 
it today. 
This still leaves the question of “how”—how does one effectively impose 
a currently-assessed tax on investment income? We do not mean to minimize 
the challenges involved, although we will note again that there are already 
proposals in the literature that we think would do a reasonable job of 
 
242 See supra notes 167–168 and accompanying text. 
243 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra, at 158–59. 
244 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. 111-312, § 301(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3300. 
245 Id. § 301(c). 
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addressing these challenges while enacting current-assessment reforms.246 
Advocates for future-assessment reforms or for maintaining the current 
tax system typically object to these current-assessment reform proposals by 
citing some combination of: (a) the administrative difficulties of taxing the 
accrued income from hard-to-value assets, (b) concerns about taxpayers 
having sufficient liquidity to pay periodic taxes, and (c) worries about the 
constitutionality of some federal-level current-assessment approaches that 
might be at risk of being considered “direct taxes.” Most of all, the opponents 
of current-assessment reforms have argued that alternative future-assessment 
approaches to reform are good enough so that there is no need to deal with 
these challenges.  
We hope we have dealt with this latter complaint by explaining why 
future-assessment taxes are emphatically not good enough. But the former 
complaint remains—how do we deal with the problems of valuation, of 
liquidity, and of constitutionality? 
With respect to the ultra-wealthy, we view liquidity as mostly a non-issue. 
If current-assessment reforms are directed at the ultra-wealthy, as we believe 
they should be, then reformers need not be much concerned about whether 
there are sufficient liquid assets to pay an annual tax on unrealized income. 
Arguably, there may be limited exceptions, but in those very limited 
scenarios in which liquidity may still be a significant concern with respect to 
some ultra-wealthy taxpayers (such as perhaps the founders of start-up 
companies) it is not overly difficult to build mechanisms into current-
assessment reforms for resolving liquidity concerns in those specific 
scenarios.247   
The constitutionality and valuation challenges are potential more vexing, 
but scholarship on both issues has advanced considerably in recent years,248 
such that in our view neither are insurmountable barriers. We will have more 
to say about both of these topics in subsequent work, but we hope that this 
Article also serves as a research agenda and a call-to-arms for tax scholars to 
continue to push forward to develop further innovative solutions.     
Despite decades of endless discussions and tax reform efforts, the 
realization doctrine and the ability to defer income remain—the “original sin” 
 
246 See supra notes 26-27. 
247 See supra note 27 
248 For an early draft of our views as to how a federal wealth tax or other current-
assessment reform could be designed to ensure its constitutionality, see John R. Brooks and 
David Gamage, Why a Wealth Tax is Definitely Constitutional, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3489997 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489997. For early 
drafts of some of our proposals for resolving valuation issues in designing a wealth tax or 
other current-assessment reform, see Gamage, Five Key Research Findings on Wealth 
Taxation, supra note 22. See also supra note 27, and also the proposals and drafts cited in 
note 26 supra.     
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of our tax system—eroding the fundamental fairness and effectiveness of our 
tax system and of our political economy more generally. We think that a 
major reason for this is that tax scholars and reform advocates have failed to 
appreciate the need for current-assessment reform. We have thus argued both 
that developing better current-assessment reform proposals should be at the 
top of the agenda for tax policy scholars and that pushing for the enactment 
of some approach for current-assessment reform should be at the top of the 
agenda for tax reform advocates.  
Substantial tax reforms are hard to pass, and so if the next major tax 
reform fails to enact current assessment, we may not get another shot. Unless 
we aim to tax now, we may ultimately tax never. 
